We argue that overconfidence of CEO helps to explain dividend decisions. Since overconfident CEOs are prone to overinvest, they would like to declare dividend less frequently and pay smaller amount of dividends as well. The reduction in dividends of overconfident CEO is larger if firms with higher growth opportunity, but smaller if firms with higher cash flow and larger firm size. The short-run stock market reactions, cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), to dividend-increase declarations are significantly positive for non-overconfident CEOs, but not significantly positive for overconfident CEOs. However, there is no significant difference for the two groups of CEOs in the short-run. The magnitude of long-run positive reactions, buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR), to dividend-increase events are also significant for non-overconfident CEOs. Specifically, the BHAR of overconfident CEOs are significantly lower than non-overconfident CEOs in the long run. Overall, overconfidence of CEOs can explain the dividend policies.