- 學位論文
論標準必要專利權行使與限制-以F/RAND授權爭議為中心
Study on the Enforcement of Standard Essential Patents and its Limitations-- Focus on F/RAND License Issues
摘要
近年來因標準必要專利權人與實施標準者無法就F/RAND權利金達成共識，標準必要專利權人走向法院行使專利權之情形較往年多。如Apple Inc.與 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.在美國、歐盟、日本及韓國等世界各地發動標準必要專利訴訟戰爭，引起各國法院及主管機關注意。 標準必要專利訴訟，有如全球性戰爭，其他國家對於此問題處理態度亦影響我國相關產業發展。故本文將先討論標準設定組織與智慧財產權政策相關運作，特別是標準必要專利權人之揭露義務及F/RAND授權義務；繼而逐一就相關國家如美國、歐盟、日本及中國相關法制度運作及具體案例適用，分別予以分析探討。之後，並進一步檢討各國法制度下標準必要專利權之行使及限制，以及學者間針對反公有悲劇、專利叢林、專利箝制、權利金堆疊等議題分歧之態度，與該等態度對於F/RAND授權爭議處理方式之影響。最後，探討我國應如何因應本議題，並提出我國處理本議題之政策思考方向及本論文結論。 本文認為解決F/RAND授權爭議之方法，應能促使兩造進行協商，但不宜過度偏向標準必要專利權人或實施標準者，公平交易法相關處罰規定易生反向專利箝制風險，宜先以誠實信用原則及權利濫用禁止原則作為基準，調整雙方利益及標準必要專利權人權利行使範圍，且亦能將未具有獨占地位或優勢地位之標準必要專利權人納入規範範圍，使其亦有依誠實信用原則協商之義務，促使授權成立。雙方行為之標準，得參考歐盟、美國及日本案例，作為判斷是否依誠實信用履行之行為標準。在限制標準必要專利權人專利權之行使時，亦應同時讓標準必要專利權人能夠獲得適當補償（F/RAND權利金），由法院依相關F/RAND權利金計算方式，並參照雙方在協商過程中所提出之資料決定F/RAND權利金數額。 如欲以公平交易法處理F/RAND授權爭議，適用上宜謹慎，如日本修正「獨占禁止法關於智慧財產利用指導方針」，將誠實信用原則及契約先義務協商之類型納入管制範圍，不宜直接推定已有獨占或優勢地位或必然屬濫用行為，並可搭配行政指導及行政和解等方式處理。若欲修正專利法，增加法定授權規定或依衡平原則允許專利權之行使，亦應符合TRIPS協定相關規定。
並列摘要
In recent years, it became often that standard essential patent owners could not reach settlements with standard implementers and eventually filed lawsuits against standard implementers for the purpose of preventing infringing activities of standard implementers. The patent lawsuits between Apple Inc. and Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. attracted worldwide attention from the courts and the authorities of the nations. How the courts and governments in other countries to deal with these issues will have considerable impact on the related industries in Taiwan. This Dissertation firstly discusses the operation of the standard-setting institutions and their intellectual properties policies, especially the standard essential patent owners’ obligations to disclose standard essential patents and license those patents on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms (“F/RAND license”). Furthermore, this Dissertation looks into the legal system and the cases of the countries, including the United States, the European Union, Japan and China, regarding the F/RAND license issues. This Dissertation also reviews and discusses divergent arguments regarding the enforcement of the standard essential patents, as well as the limitations on the enforcement, the tragedy of anti-commons, patent thickets, patent holdup, and the royalty stacking risk. In the end, this Dissertation explores the possible solutions when the courts or the authorities are required to deal these issues and proposes a framework that helps Taiwan better resolve the F/RAND license issues. The author believes that the best approach to the F/RAND license issues should be able to push both parties to voluntarily negotiate with each other and conclude with a reasonable deal in terms of a license agreement. For the author, this reasonable deal does not overly favor any particular party. It is easy to incur reverse holdup risk if the authority punishes the standard essential patent owners based on the Taiwan Fair Trade Act. Therefore, the author argues that it is better to adjust both parties’ interests and settle down a proper limitation on the enforcement standard essential patents, with the guidance given by the principle of bona fide and on the prohibition of abuse of rights.