- 學位論文
不確定需求與高產能成本之寡占產業的產能策略賽局模式
A Gaming Model of Capacity Strategy Analysis in an Oligopoly Industry of Uncertain Demand and High Investment Cost
摘要
高科技產業是台灣目前在世界的競爭主力，而高科技製造業中的需求不確定、產能投資成本高、技術更迭快速，導致廠商經營風險高、企業間競爭激烈，弱勢廠商容易被市場所淘汰，產業結構會由產業發展初期的眾多廠商角逐的情況，逐漸演變為寡佔競爭，半導體製造與液晶顯示面板產業是近年明顯的例子。高科技寡佔競爭的產業景氣循環現象非常明顯且劇烈，產能供給與需求經常發生失衡，產能投資的決策不僅決定經營獲利，也會影響廠商的長期競爭力，因此產能投資是廠商的在考量永續經營時的重要決策。在產業發展初期，由於市場成長快，各家廠商的產能計畫大致可以依據本身的成本、價格、需求等資料而制訂，但是寡佔競爭逐漸成形後，各廠商的價格與需求都會發生密切的互動，賽局模式因此將成為廠商產能規劃的重要情境考量。由於我國許多高科技製造產業逐漸變成寡占市場，相關產能策略的制訂是企業發展的重要研究需求。 針對上述之產業發展現況，本文以營收為產能擴充之績效指標發展出產能策略選取模式。利用廠商之售價、成本、市場佔有率等資料，搭配市場需求情況，分析在市場上產能供給與需求不均衡時廠商的策略選取，並提出賽局模式，當市場中不同競爭條件的廠商面臨不確定需求及龐大不可逆成本時，採取不同策略之預期營收，並歸納出基本競爭原則，結果得出技術領先廠商與技術落後廠商都會採取積極的策略，但技術落後的廠商營收較低，不利長期經營。
並列摘要
Many high-tech manufacturing industries can be characterized by intense competition, high capacity investment cost, rapid technology advancement and uncertain demand. These characteristics tend to weed out weaker firms and drive an industry toward an oligopoly as it passes the embryonic stage. Examples of such industries include semiconductor manufacturing and liquid crystal display manufacturing. In an oligopoly, a firm can not afford to make capacity decisions based on cost-benefit analysis alone; potential actions of the opponents must also be taken into consideration. In this paper, a gaming analysis method is described for designing capacity strategies in oligopoly competition with high irreversible investment cost and high demand uncertainty. This paper focuses on semiconductor manufacturing. Industry data of average selling price and manufacturing costs are utilized in the analysis. An optimal capacity model that a firm might undertake while disregarding the opponent’s action is first described. This model is based on tradeoff between over-capacity and under-capacity when the demand is highly uncertain and representable as a Brownian motion process and is used to determine myopic capacity decision of individual firms. In the second part of the paper, mathematical formulas are derived for modeling the behavior of the market leader and follower. Finally, a gaming analysis method is presented to analyze the gaming interaction between the players of the game and to compare the outcomes of aggressive and conservative strategies by the leader and the follower. The paper illustrates two results: both the players will take aggressive strategies; the follower cannot keep long-term success for its revenue appreciably lower than the leader.