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  • 學位論文

公司治理與公司投資決策

Corporate Governance and Firm Investments

指導教授 : 王衍智
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摘要


本研究蒐集2005至2016年間的曾於台灣上市櫃之公司為樣本,試圖檢驗公司投資決策(以營運資金、長期投資及資本支出等三個項目衡量)與公司治理程度(超額公司治理指數)之間的關係。本研究中的超額公司治理指數,係沿用Jenter and Lewellen(2015)和Fich, Harford and Tran(2015)的方法進行建置,希望藉由超額公司治理指數的建立,相較過往文獻多以單一指標表衡量公司治理效果,能捕捉更為全面的公司治理程度及效果。 主要實證結果發現,超額公司治理指數與營運資金投資變數之間,存在統計顯著的負向關係。另外,本研究尚探討以赫芬達競爭指數及股東權益市值的分群迴歸模型。其中股東權益市值分群樣本的迴歸結果,則顯示營運資金及資本支出投資變數與超額公司治理指數,分別呈現統計顯著的負向及正向關係。
 本研究最後小節更納入La Porta(1999)之投票權與現金流量權偏離的計算方式,以「股份盈餘偏離衡量指標」作為控制變數,試圖檢驗本研究建立之超額公司治理指數,能否保有前述迴歸模型顯現之解釋能力。迴歸結果與先前主要實證統計差異不大,顯示超額公司治理指數確實能對部分投資決策變數提供解釋能力。

並列摘要


The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between a company's investment decision and its corporate governance using samples of Taiwan listed firms during the period from 2006 to 2016. Investment decision by a company is measured by working capital, long-term investment and capital expenditure respectively. We expect to capture a more comprehensive degree and effectiveness of corporate governance under the abnormal governance index. The study provides empirical evidence that there exists a statistically significant negative correlation between abnormal governance index and working capital investment. Also, under market capitalization-clustered regression model, capital expenditures are positively related to the abnormal governance index respectively, which could be explained by common phenomenon for high-cap companies with more access to outer funding by higher confidence on their internal governance than those in low-cap. The last subsection of this study includes another control variable, the deviation of cash flow and voting rights followed by La Porta (1999). This variable is aimed at gauging whether the abnormal governance index established in this study can retain its explanatory power of the aforementioned regression model. The results suggested small differences from the previous empirical statistics, showing that the abnormal governance index does indeed provides the ability to explain the changes of working capital investment variables.

參考文獻


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