並列摘要
There are three essays in this dissertation. The first essay discusses the role of bonuses in CEO inside debt holdings. Prior literature states that the advantage of inside debt holdings is that they mitigate managerial risk-taking incentives and increase earnings quality. After considering the composition of inside debt in which pension benefits are contingent on bonus plans, my results show that once CEO inside debt holdings are related to bonus plans, the advantage of inside debt holdings may disappear. The second essay discusses that the learning process of shareholders reduces the variance of stock returns, thereby making stock return become a more direct estimate of an executive’s level of efforts. My results suggest that according to learning theory, firm age is an important factor determining executive stock-based incentives. The third essay discusses whether the presence of overlapping memberships on the compensation committee impacts the effective structure of executive compensation. Firms with the compensation committee members on other firms’ compensation committees (“external overlapping memberships”) and on the audit committees (“internal overlapping memberships”) may have different compensation structures than those without. My study provides evidence that overlapping memberships on the compensation committee influence the compensation setting process.
參考文獻
Chapter 1
Amihud, Y., Lev, B., 1981. Risk reduction as a managerial motive for conglomerate mergers. The Bell Journal of Economics 12, 605-617.
Anantharaman, D., Fang, V.W., Gong, G., 2013. Inside debt and the design of corporate debt contracts. Management Science, Forthcoming. .
Armstrong, C.S., Larcker, D.F., Ormazabal, G., Taylor, D.J., 2013. The relation between equity incentives and misreporting: The role of risk-taking incentives. Journal of Financial Economics 109, 327-350.
Bebchuk, L.A., Jackson, R.J., 2005. Executive pensions. Journal of Corporation Law 30, 823-855.