選擇性協助或異議:  我國一致性政府下立法院長  對重大爭議議案之影響

一致性政府下，為何有些重大爭議法案可以在立法院快速三讀，但有些卻遲遲拖延到會期結束仍被擱置？本研究首度提出「委託─代理關係」的理論架構來分析一致政府下立法院長對重大爭議法案的影響。根據此一理論架構，一致政府下的立法院長是可能身兼黨主席的總統在立法院的代理人。因此，當總統公開表達希望某項重大爭議法案在立法院通過時，理想的立法院長會忠於身兼黨主席的總統委託，選擇性協助總統來加速該法案通過；同時，本研究還認為有兩個主要因素將導致「代理失靈」，而使立法院長不忠於身兼黨主席的總統委託，對重大爭議法案選擇性異議來拖延該法案通過：一、立法院長在立法院的資歷越深；二、立法院長和總統在黨內未有政治聯盟。透過分析馬英九與蔡英文總統任內的八項重大爭議法案，並訪談包括兩位前任及一位現任立法院長，兩位前立法院長幕僚，三位立法院兩大黨黨團幹部，以及一位在野黨團助理，本研究發現立法院長與總統的委託代理關係確為重大爭議法案在立法院是被加速通過與否的重要關鍵因素。本研究結果有助於學界理解我國在一致政府下的重大爭議法案通過或擱置的立法過程，同時也對於未來總統行使立法院長的提名具有實務啟示。

關鍵字

重大爭議法案；立法院長；一致性政府；委託─代理關係

並列摘要

Why are some major controversial bills passed in the Legislative Yuan quickly while others are delayed until the end of the session and remain on hold? This study proposes the theoretical framework of "principal-agent relationship" for the first time to explain the influence of the head of Legislative Yuan on major controversial bills under unified governments in Taiwan. According to this framework, the head of Legislative Yuan is agent of President, who may also be the chairman of the incumbent political party. Therefore, when the President publicly expresses his desire for a major controversial bill to be passed, this study expects the head of Legislative Yuan be loyal to the presidential mandate and would therefore expedite the passage of the bill to assist the President. Meanwhile, this study also shows that there are two main factors that would lead to “agency failure” which makes the head of Legislative Yuan disloyal to the President, thus objecting the presidential mandate and delaying the passage of major controversial bills in the legislative session. The first factor is the seniority of the head of Legislative Yuan. The second is whether the head of Legislative Yan and President enter a political coalition within the incumbent party. Through analyzing the eight major controversial bills under President Ma Ying-jeou and President Tsai Ing-wen, and interviewing two former and one current heads Legislative Yuan, three cadres of two major parties in Legislative Yuan, and an assistant to the opposition, this study finds that the principal-agent relationship between the head of Legislative Yuan and President is indeed an important key factor for the accelerated and delayed passage of major controversial bills in the Legislative Yuan. This study contributes to the legislative study of how major controversial bills get passed and delayed under the unified government in Taiwan. It also has practical policy implications for the presidential nomination of the head of legislature in the future.