論銀行董事會之獨立性——以提名委員會為中心

我國自2006年於證券交易法引進獨立董事以來，銀行的內部治理結構逐漸朝著單軌制前進，即係期待獨立董事能夠提高董事會獨立性，強化董事內部相互監督之功能，並透過專業分工及具獨立性之功能委員會協助董事會決策。然而，我國銀行股權結構多為集中型態，控制股東多為政府或家族集團，因此控制股東多半掌控著銀行董事會，而獨立董事在此具有集中型股權特色的銀行中，重要的職責之ㄧ即是監督控制股東之自我交易行為，以避免有利益輸送之不法情事。本文從獨立董事的人數與比例、任期以及董事會組成結構分析我國銀行董事會之獨立性。首先，相較於其他同屬於集中型股權結構之國家，我國銀行獨立董事的人數與比例要求偏低；再者，在近十年來的發展下，我國銀行獨立董事之任期確實有偏高的情形；此外，由於我國公司法將董事會定位為業務導向，董事長自多由控制股東擔任或指派之，且集中型股權特色亦使董事會多受控制股東把持，進而導致我國銀行獨立董事之提名多受到控制股東的影響。因此，觀察上述種種現象，本文以為我國銀行董事會的獨立性確實不足。為了提高我國銀行董事會之獨立性，本文以「○○股份有限公司提名委員會組織規程參考範例」為基礎，提出修正建議。首先，銀行應設立提名委員會以負責董事會提名事務。其次，委員會組成應至少有三名係由董事會推派之成員，過半數的委員會成員應具有獨立性，且委員會亦應有至少一名少數股東代表，而該少數股東代表應由持有一千股以上之股東以一人一票的方式選出。此外，委員會成員每屆任期為三年，連選得連任，但不得超過三次。再者，關於會議之召集，委員會的召集人和主席應具有獨立性，且為鼓勵召開會議，召集人經其他委員請求召集時應召集之，如召集人不為召集通知時，得經二分之一以上成員同意召集之；為促進委員會運作和訊息流通，委員會主席應在提交最終建議前與董事會協商。最後，關於資訊的揭露，為了使股東更加了解候選人之推薦來源與背景資料，提名委員會應詳實地公告候選人推薦來源，且提名委員會主席亦應列席公司股東會並負相關說明義務。

關鍵字

銀行治理；集中型股權結構；控制股東；少數股東；董事會獨立性；獨立董事；提名委員會

並列摘要

Since the introduction of independent directors under the Securities and Exchange Act in 2006, the governance structure of Taiwanese banks has been gradually moving toward a one-tier system. It is expected that independent directors will enhance the board of directors’ independence, strengthen directors’ mutual supervision, and assist the board of directors through board committees. However, the concentrated ownership structure is a common feature of Taiwanese banks, and bank controlling shareholders are mostly the government or a family. Therefore, the controlling shareholders are primarily in control of the board of directors. In that case, independent directors have been considered an important strategy of bank governance to supervise controllers in conflicting decisions. In this thesis, I analyze the board independence of Taiwanese banks in terms of the number and proportion of independent directors, the tenure of independent directors, and the composition of the board of directors. First of all, requirements for the number and proportion of independent directors are relatively low, compared with other countries in a concentrated ownership structure. Furthermore, the tenure of independent directors is indeed high over the past fifteen years. In addition, the election of independent directors is often dominated by the controlling shareholders who hold majority shares and control the board of directors. As a result, I argue that the board independence of Taiwanese banks is insufficient. To strengthen banks’ board independence, I propose suggestions for the “Sample Template of XXX Co., Ltd. Charter of Nominating Committee”. First, banks shall have in place a nominating committee that identifies and nominates directorate candidates. Second, the Committee shall be composed of at least three members appointed by the board of directors, and the majority members shall be independent. Besides, the Committee shall include a member who is the representative of minority shareholders, elected based on a system of one shareholder holding more than 1000 shares one vote. Third, the term of office of a Committee member shall not exceed three years, eligible for re-election no more than three times. Fourth, the convener and chairperson of the Committee meeting shall be an independent member. Moreover, to encourage him/her to convene meetings, the convener shall convene meetings at the request of Committee members. If the convener fails to convene meetings, the meeting may be convened by the approval of the majority of the Committee members. Fifth, to promote the operation of the committee and flow of information, the Committee chairperson shall consult with the board of directors before submitting the final recommendation. Finally, to enable minority shareholders to understand the recommender of directorate candidates and other background information, the Committee shall announce the recommender of each directorate candidate. The Committee chairperson shall further attend shareholders’ meetings to explain the nominating decisions.

並列關鍵字

Bank Governance ； Concentrated Owernship ； Controlling Shareholders ； Minority Shareholders ； Independence of Board of Directors ； Independent Director ； Nominating Committee