論股權估值調整機制：以中國對賭協議為核心

股權估值調整機制（valuation adjustment mechanism）是一種投資契約條款，用於處理融資企業的估值不確定性問題，一般係透過設定融資方未來的特定發展指標，並以該指標是否達成來調整融資方與投資方的權利義務關係，進而達到股權估值的調整效果。而此調整機制在中國私募股權基金與成長型企業間被廣泛地應用，最早被各界關注的案件即蒙牛企業與摩根斯坦利間的「對賭案」，被關注的焦點除了蒙牛企業因此獲得驚人的成長以外，更聚焦在雙方所簽定的投資契約條款中，含有博弈性質濃厚的股權估值調整機制。由於該條款的實務運作多半使得投資方與融資方間賭上巨大的經濟利益在估值的認定階段，也因此該種條款在中國得名「對賭協議」。我國近年資金市場中亦不乏創投、私募基金重振的跡象，本文認為提早將已經在亞洲鄰近市場沸議的投資契約條款進行分析研究，將對我國未來投資市場的商事法律環境建構有所助益。本文從股權估值機制的理論背景切入，並以中國對賭協議作為具體化的研究對象，解構對賭協議的構成要素、類型，以及整理目前學者提出的對賭協議動機理論，進而比較分析類似的投資契約條款；其次，本文從法律經濟分析的角度切入，以著名的交易成本理論和近年商事契約特別著重的風險分配觀點作為分析工具，在理論與實務上檢驗對賭協議的功用與問題；最後，本文回歸傳統法律效力面的討論框架，先就對賭協議在我國法治環境下的法律定性做討論，再檢討分析中國司法實務已就對賭協議做成的見解，進而從資本維持原則與董事忠實義務的規範思考對賭協議在我國的適法性。

關鍵字

股權估值；對賭協議；私募股權；法律經濟分析；公司法；資本維持原則

並列摘要

The valuation adjustment mechanism (VAM) is a kind of investment contractual clause that is designed to deal with the uncertainty of the financing entity’s valuation. Generally, VAM is concluded between the Private Equity (PE) investor and the invested company, agreeing upon some conditions by which the investors may exercise the right to adjust the valuation when the conditions are satisfied. The VAM Agreement is widely employed in the PE investment activities in China, especially between PE and growth-oriented enterprises. The earliest cases in China that have attracted attention from the public is, namely, the “gambling case” between Mengniu Enterprise and Morgan Stanley Private Equity. In addition to the amazing growth of Mengniu Enterprise, the public’s focus is on the gambling contract terms signed by both parties, which contains a game-based valuation adjustment mechanism. Since then, many Chinese growth companies and private equity funds have adopted such contractual clauses in investment contracts. In most practical mode of operation of such clauses, there are huge economic benefits between investors and financiers bet on the valuation adjustment. It is probably why such a clause may therefore be known as “bet-on agreement” in China. The background of the bet-on agreement in China is the enthusiasm of private equity funds, and there are many signs of reinvigorating venture capital and private equity funds in Taiwan's capital market in recent years. This paper believes that studying the investment contract clauses that have already been discussed in the adjacent markets in Asia will help the construction of commercial legal environment in Taiwan's future investment market. Therefore, it is hoped that by this paper Taiwan will be able to invest more in-depth research and detailed discussion of VAM in the future. This paper starts with the theoretical background of VAM, and takes the cases of the bet-on agreement in China as specific research object, deconstructing the constituent elements and types of the bet-on agreement, organizing the current theory of the motives proposed by scholars, and comparing it with similar investment contractual terms. Secondly, this paper will introduce the perspective of legal economic analysis, and uses the famous transaction cost theory and the viewpoint of risk distribution viewpoint as the analytical tools. Then, go on testing the function and problem of the bet-on agreement in theory and practice. Finally, this paper returns to the discussion traditional framework of the legal studying, also known as the study of legal effect. To start with the discussion of the legal nature of VAM, this paper will then review and analyze the judicial practice in China made on the bet-on agreement. At the end, this paper will conclude the legality of VAM in Taiwan, with the norm of corporate law mainly focused on the capital maintenance principle and the fiduciary duty.