強制性財務預測規定取消對管理當局自願性盈餘預測揭露行為之影響--以公司治理角度分析

The Impact of Terminating Mandatory Financial Forecasts on Management Earnings Forecast Behavior—In the Perspectives on Corporate Governance

陳思穎(Sz-Ying Chen)

指導教授 ： 王泰昌 ； 劉嘉雯

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/會計學研究所/碩士(2007年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2007.02594

摘要

金融監督管理委員會規定於民國94年1月1日起正式取消強制性財務預測之規定，希望改為自願性財務預測能使資訊揭露的品質提高。本研究主要目的係在探討強制性財務預測規定取消對於管理當局自願性盈餘預測揭露行為的影響，並以公司治理的角度探討，分析其對管理當局自願性盈餘預測行為的影響，及在強制性規定改變前後，公司治理各變數對盈餘預測行為的影響是否有所改變。
實證結果顯示，當公司董事會規模愈大、獨立董事比例愈低、負債比率愈高時，管理當局揭露自願性盈餘預測的意願愈高，且當獨立董事比例愈高時，管理當局愈可能過於樂觀預測盈餘，而強制性財務預測規定取消後，管理當局發佈自願性盈餘預測的意願明顯降低，且管理當局傾向過於樂觀預測盈餘。在公司治理交互影響部份，電子產業在強制性規定取消前，當獨立董事佔董事席次比例愈低時，管理當局發佈自願性盈餘預測的可能性愈高，但在強制性規定取消後，獨立董事比例愈低，管理當局反而不傾向發佈自願性盈餘預測，非電子產業部份則影響方向相同，但不具顯著性；非電子產業在強制性規定取消前，當公司負債比率愈大，管理當局發佈自願性盈餘預測的可能性愈高，而強制性規定取消後，其影響雖不具顯著性，但負債比例愈大，管理當局反而不傾向發佈盈餘預測，電子產業之負債比率影響則不具顯著性。

關鍵字

自願性盈餘預測 ； 公司治理 ； 揭露意願 ； 準確性 ； 樂觀偏差

並列摘要

Financial Supervisory Commission of Executive Yuan has decided to terminate the regulation of mandatory disclosure of financial forecasts in order to improve the quality of financial forecasts since 2005. The study examines the effect of terminating the mandatory regulation on management earnings forecasts’ behavior. Furthermore, we examine the change of the effects of corporate governance on management earnings forecasts after terminating the regulation.
The empirical results show that firms with larger size of board of director, less independent directors, and greater debt ratio are more likely to issue earning forecasts voluntarily. In addition, firms with more outside directors are inclined to forecast more optimistically. After terminating the regulation of mandatory disclosure of financial forecasts, managers are less likely to make an earnings forecast and inclined to forecast more optimistically. Additional analysis suggests that companies of electronics industry which have more independent directors are less likely to issue earnings forecasts voluntarily before terminating the regulation. But after terminating the regulation, the proportion of independent directors is positively associated with the willingness of disclosure. Companies of non-electronic industry with greater debt ratio are more likely to make an earnings forecast before terminating the regulation. After terminating the regulation, debt ratio is negatively associated with the willingness of disclosure. But the effect of debt ratio is not obvious.

並列關鍵字

Voluntary earnings forecasts ； Corporate governance ； willingness of disclosure ； Accuracy ； Optimistic biased

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