異質競標者下之備標補償賽局模型

業主在辦理複雜性高、有高備標成本的採購計畫時，如DB、BOT計畫，常會考慮支付備標補償給評價最高的未得標廠商，借此激勵所有參與競標的廠商在製作計畫書時，投入額外努力與成本。有高備標成本的計畫其範疇往往相當大，常是業主與競標廠商最為重要的案件，計畫成功與否影響雙方的利潤甚巨，從此可見備標補償策略之議題的重要性。至於異質性競標者指的是說，在不同標案中，競標廠商之專業、商譽等，得利的狀況不盡相同，尤其是屬於私部門之標案，業主偏好影響甚大，競標者之間的優劣可能相當明顯。因此，競標者之優劣地位對於得標機率之影響，也是本文的研究重點之一。本文的研究目的是在競標者有異質性的情況下，分析競標者參與有備標補償的標案之行為與心態，建立賽局決策模型。研究重點在競標廠商的行為與策略，探討備標補償的影響，並發展備標補償的決策概念。本文主要應用賽局理論來分析競標廠商與計畫業主的行為動態，並加入前人研究未考慮之異質競標者情境。最後基於賽局理論分析的備標補償模型，提出均衡解和雙方備標補償策略的意涵。

關鍵字

備標補償；異質競標者；賽局理論；專案管理；品質提升

並列摘要

For projects with high bid preparation cost, such as DB, BOT project, it is often suggested that the owner should consider paying bid compensation to the most highly ranked unsuccessful bidders to stimulate extra effort or inputs in bid preparation. The scope of the project with high bid preparation is often huge, and the stakeholders attach importance to it. Therefore, the project execution affects the profits a lot, and that exhibits importance of bid compensation issues. Heterogeneous bidders assumption in the article reflect the fact some bidders have advantages in the bid due to specialized field, or reputation, etc. Especially, if the owner is private company, bid advantages is significantly affected by the preference of the owner. How that kind of relative advantages affect the chance of winning the bid is one of chief considerations. This article aims to analyze bidders’ behaviors and considerations in a bid with bid compensation, study the impacts of bid compensation. Game theory is applied to analyze the behavioral dynamics between competing heterogeneous bidders and project owners. A bid compensation model based on game theoretic analysis is developed in this study. The model provides equilibrium solutions under bid compensation, quantitative formula, and qualitative implications for the formation of bid compensation strategies.

並列關鍵字

Bid compensation ； Heterogeneous bidder ； Game theory ； Project management ； Quality improvement

參考文獻

23. 蔡弘祥，(2005)，”建築工程設計品質評量指標之研究”，國立台灣大學土木工程學系研究所碩士論文。

2. Bajari, P. & Tadelis, S. (2001). Incentives versus transaction cost: a theory of procurement contracts. The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol.32, No.3, p387-407.

4. Eriksson, P. E. (2008). Procurement Effects on Coopetition in Client-Contractor Relationships. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, Vol.134, No.2.

5. Erikksson, P. E., & Pesamaa, O. (2007). Modelling Procurement Effects on Cooperation. Construction Management and Economics, Vol.25, No.8, p893-901.

8. Ho, S. P. (2005) Bid Compensation Decision Model for Projects with Costly Bid Preparation. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, ASCE, Vol. 131, No.2.

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異質競標者下之備標補償賽局模型

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