百大企業持續性之研究

周慶祥(Cing-Siang Chou)

指導教授 ： 柯承恩

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/會計學研究所/碩士(2004年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2004.02143

摘要

本研究擬採市值為決定百大之因素，並從公司治理的角度出發，研究台灣從1990年至2002年，影響企業市值能夠持續為百大之因素，並比較其與市值非持續為百大之企業的差異。本研究之樣本資料取自於「台灣經濟新報社資料庫」，另外考量金融保險業之營業性質及財務結構較為特殊，與其他產業差距較大予以排除後共得有效樣本667家。經由Logistic迴歸分析後，實證結果如下：
1.市值百大之企業變化快速，由原先的傳統製造業轉變為資訊電子業。除此之外，一旦公司營運不佳，或是管理不當，往往造成公司被擠出百大之外。
2.董事會人數為影響台灣地區上市公司市值持續為百大的重要因素，惟其在第二個群組中並未達到顯著水準。但從趨勢圖來看，仍可發現市值持續為百大之公司董事會人數多於市值非持續為百大之公司。
3.從趨勢圖分析可以得知，市值持續為百大之公司的法人機構持股比率皆較市值非持續為百大之公司為高，惟其僅在第四個及第五個群組顯著，其餘群組皆呈現不顯著的狀況。
4.監察人人數僅在第二個群組顯著地影響公司市值是否能夠持續成為百大之企業，但在第三個群組中卻呈現相反之情況，顯見，監察人的功能尚未完全發揮，以至於無法影響公司市值是否能夠持續為百強。
5.董監事持股比率並非為影響公司市值持續為百大之因素，且從趨勢圖分析可以得知，兩類公司差異不大。顯見，董監事並未完全發揮其監督功能，督促公司之經營團隊，提高公司之競爭能力，使公司市值能夠成為持續地在百強之列。
6.在台灣的確存在著市值能夠持續為百大之公司，但其董事長卻兼任總經理的情況，此時，經營者並不一定就會利用其特權中飽私囊。相反的，有時更會站在公司前線，確實執行經營策略，增強公司競爭力。故，董事長兼任總經理並非為影響公司市職持續為百大之因素。

關鍵字

公司治理 ； 百大 ； 市值

並列摘要

This study takes market value for ranking top 100, and from corporate governance, studying the factors which influence business’ market value sustainable for top 100 from 1990 to 2002 in Taiwan, and compare the difference of those companies and which were not sustainable for top 100. The sample companies were grabbed from TEJ, besides considering the operation and financial structure of financial insurance industry are special, differ from other industry. So, the study eliminates this companies, and acquires 667 samples. After Logistic analysis, the empirical results are as follows:
1.Top 100 companies of market value change fast, most traditional manufacture business were no longer in top 100, instead much information electronic business were new members of top 100. If their operation or management loses formal function will cause companies out of top 100.
2.The size of the board is a important factor which influence companies’ market value sustainable for top 100. But it’s non-significance in confidence inteval 90% in the second group. The tendency graphs still show that the size of the board of this companies which are sustainable for top 100 are bigger than this companies which are not sustainable for top 100.
3.The tendency graphs show that ownership of institutional investor of this companies which are sustainable for top 100 are more than this companies which are not sustainable for top 100. The study reveals significant relationship in the forth and the fifth group but other groups don’t.
4.In the second group, supervisor significantly influences companies’ market value sustainable for top 100 but the study shows inverse situation in the third group. It reveals supervisor’s function was not yet completely used so that it can’t significant influence companies which are whether sustainable for top 100.
5.Holding ratio of directors is not the factor influence companies which are whether sustainable for top 100. In fact, directors don’t exert their whole monitoring function to enhance companies’ competitive ability and make companies’ market value sustainable for top 100.
6.In Taiwan, some companies which are sustainable for top 100 have the situation of Chairperson serves as the President concurrently, at this time manager won’t must take chance to interest himself, instead they will exercise strategy fairly to enhance companies’ competitive ability sometimes. Chairperson serves as the President concurrently is not the factor that influence companies whether being sustainable for top 100.

並列關鍵字

Market value ； Top 100 ； Corporate Governance

參考文獻

彭玉怡，「股權結構與公司價值關聯性之實證研究-價格模式與報酬模式之應用」，私立中原大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文，民國91年。

Agrawal, Anup and Charles, R. Knoebe, 1996.“Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and　Shareholders，”Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 31, 377-397.

Daily C. M. and Dalton D. R. , “Board of Directors Leadership and Structure: Control and Performance Implications” Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, 1993, 65-81.

Donaldson L. & Davis J. H. , “Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governmance and Shareholder Returns” , Australian Journal of Management ,

1991, 49- 64.