銀行參與供應鏈信用擔保機制下最佳聯貸模式之研究

Optimal Decision Model of Leading Bank of Syndicated Loan under Supply Chain Credit Guarantee Mechanism

王政(Cheng Wang)

指導教授 ： 蔣明晃

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/商學研究所/碩士(2014年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2014.02965

摘要

中小企業的經營是台灣的經濟發展的重要角色，其經營良善程度取決於產業供應鏈的運作穩定性，而融資管道的暢通與效率正是供應鏈穩定的關鍵因素。然而，中小企業常會因為企業規模小、財務不甚健全等問題而無法提供銀行足夠之擔保品，導致銀行對中小企業放款意願不高；另一方面，銀行有必須將存款貸放出去以賺取利差的需求，但對於無足夠信用擔保之客戶又會擔心違約的風險。
有鑑於此，本研究參考信保基金為中小企業推出的火金姑模式，引入製造商為其上游供應商(中小企業)提供信用擔保。由於製造商對供應商資訊較能掌握，因此當其願意和銀行共同分攤供應商違約的債務風險時，銀行就有誘因對供應商提供貸款。另外，本研究並參考聯合貸款機制，探討多家銀行以聯貸的形式分攤向供應商的貸款金額，期望能加強銀行的貸款意願，以暢通中小企業融資管道，並穩定供應鏈運作。
本研究建構數值模型探討在供應鏈各角色與銀行皆可獲利的前提下，聯貸主辦銀行應如何制訂參貸出資比例、貸款成數、貸款利率、製造商分攤債務比率等四個變數以極大化期望獲利。接著，本研究模擬不同的聯貸背景變化，對供應商違約機率、違約時供應商供貨比率、供應商原料成本、法定上限利率等四個參數做敏感度分析，藉由檢視聯貸主辦銀行最適決策的變化提供獲利管理的方法，以強化聯貸主辦行與供應鏈合作的意願。
研究結果顯示，聯貸主辦銀行於各種情境下皆選擇和參貸行平分出資，且都使用貸款利率作為提升獲利的優先方式，但當貸款利率達法定上限之後，增加獲利的手段就會隨不同情境而不盡相同。然而，實務上這些工具的使用權尚牽涉到與製造商、供應商、聯貸參貸行之間的協調，因此聯貸主辦行於協商過程的主導權力將決定其管理獲利時的有效性。

關鍵字

信用擔保機制 ； 聯合貸款 ； 中小企業 ； 供應鏈

並列摘要

Small and medium enterprise (SME) acts as an essential cornerstone in economic development in Taiwan, and its operation efficiency depends on the stability of supply chain. The effectiveness of financing channel of SME is a key issue of the stability of supply chain. However, on the one hand, SME often can’t provide sufficient credit or collateral, so the bank tends to avoid default risks by not lending money to SME, but on the other hand, the bank still needs to lend money out because the major source of its revenue comes from interest of lending. In short, there is a dilemma between supply and demand in financing channel.
To deal with this problem, a model named “Firefly Counterpart Guarantee”, which is founded by Small and Medium Enterprise Credit Guarantee Fund, is introduced in this research. This model works under credit guarantee mechanism: the manufacturer helps its supplier (SME) to have a loan from the bank by sharing part of the default risk of its supplier. If the manufacturer, a stakeholder of its supplier, can guarantee banks from part of the loss when its supplier is in default, the bank will have confidence in loaning. This research also refers to the syndicated loan mechanism: the supplier could borrow money from more than one banks. Banks would have more confidence in loaning when the default risk of the supplier is mutually shared by multiple participants. Above all, the goal of this research is to enhance the willingness of the bank when making loan to SME.
This research builds up a numerical model to maximize the expected net income of the leading bank of syndicated loan by varying four variables (Investment ratio in syndicated loan, Loan-to-value (LTV), Loan rate, and Default risk sharing ratio of the supplier by the manufacturer), under conditions of no party with negative profits. Next, this research simulates different decision-making situations by applying sensitivity analysis to four parameters (Possibility of default of the supplier, Ratio of shipment while in default, Material cost of the supplier, and Upper limit of loan rate). When a sound plan of income management is made, the leading bank would be more willing to have cooperation with supply chain under credit guarantee mechanism.
The result of this research shows that leading bank tends to equally share the loan with participant banks, and increases the loan rate as the priority method to improve profitability. While the loan rate is limited by the law or market, methods then depends on each situations. However, the practical use of above methods also involves the negotiation process between the manufacturer, the supplier, and the other banks of syndicated loan; the effectiveness of the provided plan in this research depends on the bargain power of the leading bank.

並列關鍵字

Credit Guarantee Mechanism ； Syndicated Loan ； Small and Medium Enterprise ； Supply Chain

參考文獻

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