在信用擔保機制下考量資訊不對稱時製造商對供應商最佳訂購合約設計之研究

Optimal Sourcing Contract of Manufacturer by Considering Information Asymmetry under Credit Guarantee Mechanism

曾信豪(Hsin-Hao Tseng)

指導教授 ： 蔣明晃

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/商學研究所/碩士(2013年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2013.02896

摘要

在台灣過去的經濟發展中，中小企業扮演了非常重要的地位，也是就業機會的主要提供者。然而中小企業卻常因資訊不透明或者財會制度不健全等因素，被銀行評估為風險較高的貸款對象，導致資金融通不易。
為了解決這個問題，我國政府與銀行共同捐助成立之中小企業信用保證基金會，就曾利用相對保證的方式，發展一套火金姑專案模式，期望能藉由信用擔保，結合產業上、下游廠商，共同分擔銀行授信風險。
實務上廠商常存有私有資訊，對於本身的狀態並不會完全透漏給供應鏈其他參與者知道，本研究探討在火金姑模式下中間製造商，上游中小企業供應商，下游零售商以及提供貸款銀行之供應鏈體系，考量到供應商效率類型和供貨滿足率之私有資訊以及其生產資金缺口，以製造商為此模型的推動者推動信用擔保機制在供應鏈內運行，希望在極大化製造商自身利潤下設計最佳之訂購合約，透過對供應商提供不同合約並觀察供應商之選擇解開供應鏈中資訊不對稱情況，並提出設計合約之相關結論，希望可以作為企業供應鏈運作決策時的參考來源。

關鍵字

中小企業 ； 信用擔保機制 ； 供應鏈 ； 資訊不對稱

並列摘要

Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) create many jobs and contribute a large portion of Taiwan’s GDP. In other words, they are playing an extremely important role in our economic development. However, due to low transparency of financial information and unhealthy financial/accounting system, SMEs are required to provide collateralizations as guarantee when applying for financial support to reduce the risk of loaning.
To solve this situation, Small and Medium Enterprise Credit Guarantee Fund of Taiwan (Taiwan SMEG) which comes totally from donations made by the central government and financial institutions has developed a model of “Firefly Counterpart Guarantee.” Based on this model, government expects to combine upstream firms with downstream, sharing the risk of financial loan with the bank.
Firms usually have private information that not sharing with other parties in practice. This research cites the model of “Firefly Counterpart Guarantee” as background to develop a model of supply chain interaction includes manufacturer, SME supplier, retailer and the financial institution, which offers the loan. Manufacturer is the dominate player and the trigger in this model, it offers two different contracts to the supplier to maximize its expected profit considering supplier’s capital shortage and private information such as supplier’s production cost type and fulfill rate. This model is expected to solve information asymmetric by observing which contract supplier choose to execute. We believe our model can provide a good solution to industry operations for all parties in the supply chain if credit guarantee mechanism can be applied.

並列關鍵字

Small and Medium Enterprise ； Credit Guarantee ； Supply Chain ； Information Asymmetry

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