論前瞻指引

On Forward Guidance

陳彥學(Yan-Syue Chen)

指導教授 ： 梁國源

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/經濟學研究所/碩士(2015年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2015.02741

摘要

2007年全球金融危機以來，各國利用各種不同的貨幣政策作為刺激經濟的手段。預期管理一直以來是貨幣政策成功的關鍵。作為實行溝通未來貨幣政策途徑之工具，前瞻指引主要目標為影響大眾預期。本文首先對前瞻指引的特徵、原理進行論述，並藉著了解零利率下限下，美國、英國、歐元區及日本的經濟異常條件與實施經驗，以剖析實務上前瞻指引的應用。而由於各國的前瞻指引策略仍在進行中，我們也對其實行效果進行討論。本研究發現，央行管理私部門預期可消除零利率下限帶來的扭曲。此外，長期利率為當前與未來預期短期利率之平均值，透過有信用的最適承諾政策，央行可影響短期利率之預期，將可能改變長期利率，進而影響當前總體總合需求，例如投資、消費與產出。因此，本研究認為前瞻指引能在經濟高度異常下，有效地澄清政策意圖，使央行能校正市場預期。

關鍵字

預期管理 ； 前瞻指引 ； 零利率下限 ； 經濟異常條件 ； 最適承諾政策

並列摘要

Since the onset of the global finance crisis in 2007, many countries have used various expansionary monetary policies to stimulate their economies. The management of expectations is the key to successful monetary policy at all times, and as the practice of communicating the future path of monetary policy instruments, forward guidance is aimed at influencing the public’s expectations. This essay begins with discussing the characteristics and the rationales of forward guidance. Then, through describing the extraordinary times of and motivation for using forward guidance as a monetary tool of the FRB, BOE, ECB, and BOJ at the zero lower bound, we analyze the applications of forward guidance in practice. Finally, we discuss the relating issues of its policy effects. We find that the management of private-sector expectations by the central bank can be expected to mitigate the distortions of the zero bound. Moreover, the long-term interest rate is the average of the current and expected future short-term interest rates and through a credibly optimal commitment policy, the central bank may influence expected short-term interest rates, successfully shifting the long-term bond yields and hence current macroeconomic aggregate demand such as investment, consumption and output. Therefore, we conclude that the recent increased reliance on forward guidance has helped clarify policy intentions and bring public expectations into closer alignment with central bank’s thinking in highly unusual economic circumstances.

並列關鍵字

management of expectations ； forward guidance ； zero lower bound ； extraordinary times ； optimal commitment policies

參考文獻

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