水資源管理組織的四項經濟議題

Four Economic Issues of Water Resources Administration Organization

黃偉倫(wei-lung huang)

指導教授 ： 孫立群

國立臺灣大學/生物資源暨農學院/農業經濟學研究所/博士(2005年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2005.10474

摘要

我國的水資源短缺，亟需水資源管理組織適切的「水資源管理」，所以本論文嘗試以經濟理論分析我國水資源管理組織之問題及解決方案，希望能提供我國政府有效的建議。
為了確立本論文的探討主體，第一章分析水功能循環之所有制，也就是釐清水資源應由誰管理。由第一章結論可知，水功能循環的所有制大多應以公有制管制(政府管制)，所以本論文選擇政府為各章所探討的水資源管理組織。
本論文將水資源管理組織的問題，依中央政府、地方政府及廠商間的互動，歸納為中央政府與地方政府間的代理機制問題、兩地方政府間的協商機制問題及政府與廠商間的配合機制問題等。在代理機制部分，第二章以四個經濟模型探討其問題及解決方案。模型結果證明，水資源管理組織之代理機制問題可能是由於中央政府與地方政府的目標不同及訊息不對稱，且證明「流域管理機構」與「誘因機制」是可能的解決方案。
在協商機制部分，第三章利用兩地方政府協商水資源管理量之合作賽局探討，不同協商機制(中央政府介入與否)對賽局結果的影響。模型結果證明，地方政府會選擇中央政府做代理人協商「跨區域水資源管理」，但協商所得之水資源管理量及社會淨效益較差。因此，本論文建議水資源管理組織的「跨區域水資源管理」協商機制應為外生決定為兩地方政府直接協商。
在廠商配合機制部分，第四章利用廠商自發性提供水污染防治的賽局模型，來了解自發性方案的道德約束對廠商行為的影響。模型結果證明，自發性方案可使廠商間存在一個符合道德評價相同及理性的康德準則(廠商互動的道德約束)－各廠商提供林德爾均衡量，且為柏拉圖效率解。

關鍵字

所有制 ； 水資源管理組織 ； 自發性方案 ； 協商機制 ； 代理機制

並列摘要

Due to the lack of water resources, an administration organization is needed to manage them appropriately. Therefore, by means of economic theories, the purpose of this study is to discuss some issues and find the solutions for water resources administration organization in Taiwan. It is hoped that this study will provide the government with effective alternatives.
In order to confirm which organization should be discussed, this study started from diagnosing the ownership systems of different stages in water function circulation. Doing so is to clarify which organization should be responsible for managing water resources. According to the conclusion of the first chapter, this study asserted that the public ownership system in which water resources are managed by the government should be adopted at most stages of water function circulation. Thus, the government was considered the administration organization of water resources and discussed in the other chapters.
Afterwards, from the participants of water resources management - central authority, local authorities and firms, this study generalized that the issues of the governmental administration organization of water resources are delegation mechanism, negotiation mechanism, and cooperation mechanism with firms, discussing these mechanisms in the following chapters.
To analyze delegation mechanism, in ch.2 four economic models were developed to clarify its questions and solutions. The results proved that the problems of delegation mechanism are due to the asymmetrical information and the different objectives between central authority and local authorities. Besides, the study also proved that “basin management organization” and “incentive mechanism” are alternative solutions.
To analyze negotiation mechanism, in ch.3 a cooperative game of two local authorities negotiating their quantity of water resource management was set to analyze the influence of two negotiation mechanisms, one involved by central authority and the other not. The results proved that the local authorities prefer the central authority to be the agent negotiating “inter-regional water resource management”, but receive smaller quantity of water resource management and less net social welfare. Thus, this study suggested that negotiation mechanism should be exogenously set and two local authorities should directly negotiate “inter-regional water resource management”.
To analyze cooperation mechanism, in ch.4 the game in which firms spontaneously prevent or control water pollution was set to understand how the moral restraint of voluntary agreement influences the behaviors of firms. The results proved that voluntary agreement makes firms agree with the moral restraint of firm interaction, Kantian Maxim, which meets the same moral evaluation and ration assumption. In Kantian Maxim, all firms provide Lindahl equilibrium quantity and Plato efficiency solution.

並列關鍵字

delegation mechanism ； negotiation mechanism ； voluntary agreement ； ownership system ； water resources administration organization

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