獨立董事責任之再建構－以財報不實為中心

近年來獨立董事的職位設置越來越普遍，人才需求也越來越高，在逐漸受到矚目的狀況下，獨立董事和內部董事在執業上因為定位不同、資訊取得難易有間、涉入經營深淺不一、待遇差異等，造成二者權限上的不同，凸顯獨立董事與內部董事分別論責的必要性。就執業風險上，本文透過司法實證研究，確認我國獨立董事民事責任中佔比最高者為財報不實，且相較其他被訴之責任，財報不實立法課予獨立董事推定過失責任最容易成立，民事賠償金額也最高昂。然而財報不實一律課予董事推定過失的責任，法院似乎也不會因獨立董事之特殊性而讓其免責抗辯更容易成立；除此之外當初為了減輕董事責任引入的比例賠償責任，也因為連帶責任的交叉適用，導致最終責任形成複雜又繁重的狀態。對於實務上尚不完善的獨立董事責任體系，本文觀察美國法上獨立董事監督義務及財報不實法律責任的操作與發展，嘗試具體化我國尚未建立的部分。本文最終指出，獨立董事在財報真實的把關上應由主管機關或權威機構以法規命令或執業守則等方式具體將義務列出，供其執業遵循，並讓司法機關在採納其免責抗辯時作為明確依據，在不更動現行財報不實立法下能讓獨立董事的權責相符，兼顧其盡職調查（Due Diligence）的監督義務，期能建構一個完善的獨立董事責任體系，在吸納人才與積極執業上創造雙贏，而能對我國公司治理有所裨益。

關鍵字

獨立董事；財報不實；盡職調查抗辯；比例責任；執業守則

並列摘要

In recent years, the position of independent directors has become more and more common, so the demand for talents has become higher and higher. What makes the situation attract more attention is the discrepancy between independent directors and inside directors. These two positions cause different information obtaining, management involving in, treatment receiving, which highlight the need to discuss their responsibilities separately. Through judicial empirical research, the highest proportion of independent directors’ civil liabilities in Taiwan is for financial statement misrepresentations. Moreover, compared with other accused civil responsibilities, presumed negligence liability for financial statement misrepresentations imposes the highest duty of care, and the amont of civil compensation is also the highest. However, it seems that the court doesn’t allow independent directors to make it easier to establish a defence due to their particularity. In addition, legislators introduced proportional liability to reduce directors’ liability for compensation, but the court continues to apply joint liability in those cases, resulting in complicated and burdensome ultimate liabilities. Regarding the imperfect independent director liability system in practice, this article observes the development and operation of independent directors’ supervisory obligations and legal liabilities for financial statement misrepresentations in the United States and attempts to concretize those parts that have not yet been established in Taiwan. At last, this article points out that the competent authority or authoritative agency should specify the obligations of independent directors in the form of regulations or guidelines, in order to ensure that the independent directors are clear what to do in financial reporting. Without changing the current legislation on financial statement misrepresentations, we can make the reciprocity of independent directors’ power and responsibility, strengthen their due diligence supervising obligations, and construct a complete independent director responsibility system. Since there’s a win-win situation in attracting talents and motivating them to practice actively, the corporate governance in Taiwan will definitely be benefited.