平台事業之競爭法問題研究—以雙邊市場理論為中心

「雙邊平台」是一種存在已久但在近年來才被賦予此名之事業型態，其供給對象為兩種不同而仰賴平台作為管道與對方連結的客群，這兩種不同之客群間，就平台之參與使用具有「相互依存性」，二者間存在著「間接網路效應」，且平台之價格結構（即平台對兩組消費者之價格分配方式）具有特殊性。雙邊平台之核心功能在於整合不同客群的需求，其經營模式、在經營上面臨之難題、競爭箝制力來源、消費者需求之價格彈性、追求利潤最大化之策略，以及消費者價值創造之行為模式都與單邊事業有所差異。然而，傳統的競爭法思維、分析工具以及執法經驗基本上是建立在單邊事業之架構上，若將其直接應用至雙邊平台事業上，恐會導致錯誤之積極或錯誤之消極執法。為避免競爭法之執法對市場造成不良影響，勢有必要瞭解雙邊平台之箇中意涵，以為必要之因應。本文自雙邊市場之經濟學理論以及網路效應之學理衍變出發，解析雙邊平台經營模式之經濟學意涵與特性，再分別於各個競爭法概念下進行涵攝與分析，包含相關市場範圍界定、市場力量評估、結合競爭效果評估、掠奪性定價及垂直交易限制之分析，以此呈現雙邊平台事業與單邊事業之差異處，並說明競爭法之分析應如何因應雙邊平台與單邊事業之差異、對於雙邊平台為競爭法分析時應特別考量之特性為何。最後，本文將審視各國主管機關因應雙邊平台所為之行政及立法變革、我國公平交易委員會之處理經驗，比較學理及實務上之異同，再將本文之研究發現歸結為可供執法上參酌之建議。

關鍵字

雙邊市場；雙邊平台；多邊市場；多邊平台；網路效應；間接網路效應；競爭法；反托拉斯；公平交易法

並列摘要

Two-sided platforms serve two distinct but interdependent groups of customers who rely on the platform to connect them to each other, and the demand from one group of customers depends on the demand from the other group. Indirect network effects exist across the groups of consumers. The pricing structure of a platform—the way prices are distributed between consumers on the two sides of the platform—is an important feature different from that of other business models. The key role of two-sided platforms is to coordinate the demands of distinct groups of customers. The business model, operational problems needing to be solved, competitive constraints, price elasticities of demand, and the profit-maximizing strategies, the value creation of two-sided platforms are different from that of traditional one-sided firms. However, conventional wisdom and traditional analytical tools in the field of competition law and experiences on competition law enforcement are derived basically from the one-sided business model. Applying one-sided logic to two-sided platforms while overlooking the two-sided nature might lead to false positives or false negatives which are harmful to markets and always need to be avoided. For the purpose of preventing such negative results, it is necessary to identify the differences between two-sided businesses and one-sided businesses. This thesis begins with a review of the theory of two-sided markets and the theoretical evolution of network effects and examines the economics of two-sided platforms. Secondly, this thesis applies the economics of two-sided markets to several areas of competition law, including market definition, analysis of market power, competitive effects of mergers, predatory pricing, and effects of vertical restraints to demonstrate the differences between two-sided platforms and one-sided firms and illustrate how to adapt analytical approaches to the cases involving two-sided platforms and what should be taken into consideration in the analysis of platforms. Lastly, this thesis examines the explanatory guidelines involving two-sided markets released by the competent authorities, the relevant laws in several jurisdictions, and the decisions involving two-sided markets made by Taiwan Fair Trade Commission to analyze the differences between theories and practices. The findings of this thesis are summarized into useful recommendations for competition law enforcement.

並列關鍵字

two-sided markets ； two-sided platforms ； multi-sided markets ； multi-sided platforms ； network effects ； indirect network effects ； competition law ； antitrust ； Fair Trade Act