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  • 學位論文

創投、公開資訊對 初次公開發行(IPO)折價之影響

The impact of IPO underpricing on venture capital and public information.

指導教授 : 謝志柔
共同指導教授 : 劉一成(Yi-Cheng Liu)

摘要


本研究探討創投、公開資訊與承銷價折價之間的關係。對企業而言股票公開上市乃是一重要籌措資金管道,但由於首次公開發行,市場投資者對企業感到陌生,價值不易評定,資訊不對稱的情況也由此產生。因此本研究探討創投與公開資訊的取得是否能降低資訊不對稱的程度。 本篇論文利用1997-2007年735家初次上櫃公司,檢視公開資訊與創投介入對承銷價折價的影響。本研究主要的研究焦點為:創投、內部人保留比率與先前研究中影響承銷價折價的變數。實證結果顯示:(一)有創投介入的初次公開發行公司會有較大的折價,其有一大部分的原因來自於產業效果。(二)沒有任何一個變數可以有效地解決資訊不對稱的問題。(三)最後,根據熱發行市場的文獻,我們檢視公開申購日前四十天的平均市場報酬對承銷價折價的影響。本研究發現此變數對於承銷價折價有很好的解釋與預測的能力。

並列摘要


This research examines the relationship among venture capital, public information and IPO underpricing. Publicly unfamiliar with the business and the speech share’s appearing on market being one important financing piping, but due to for the very first time publishing publicly, the market investor to the business, worth assess not easily, information asymmetry also produces from here. So this research set to throw whether the venture capital backing、public information available can reduce the information asymmetry. We examine the extent to which IPO underpricing reflect public information and VC-backed issue for 735 companies that stocks are Initial public offerings (IPO) on the Over-the-counter Market between 1997 and 2007.This essay focus on : venture capital backing, share overhang, and variable which appear on previous study that affect IPO underpricing . Empirical result suggest that: the tendency for VC-backed IPOs to be more underpriced appears to be in large part an industry effect. There are no variable can be effectively to solve information asymmetry problem. Finally, motivated by the hot issue markets literature, we examine the influence of average 40 days market return before offer date on IPO underpricing. We show that such a variable has significant predictive power to IPO underpricing.

參考文獻


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