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  • 學位論文

柯林頓政府調停以巴和談之策略

Clinton Administration's Strategy for Mediating Israeli-Palestinian Talks

指導教授 : 黃介正

摘要


本論文的研究主旨在探討美國柯林頓政府任內,介入以色列與巴勒斯坦之和平進程所採取的策略。以色列與巴勒斯坦之衝突自第二次世界大戰以來,逐漸成為中東衝突的核心問題。由於美國在中東地區有重大的國家利益存在,然而維護以色列之生存卻與拉攏阿拉伯國家兩利益互相衝突,所以最好兼顧兩美國利益的方式,就是調解以巴雙方的衝突。柯林頓政府享有調停以巴和談之最好時機,2000之大衛營回合談判更是歷來最接近最終和平之高峰會,可惜仍功敗垂成。 柯林頓政府甫上任之角色為協助者,隨著美國投入的心血與日俱增,以及奧斯陸架構緩慢的進展中,美國逐漸成為主導談判架構的調停者。然而和平進程卻推行得十分不順利,以色列與巴勒斯坦的強硬派屢屢因意識形態之爭,而製造出破壞和解氣氛之負面行為。柯林頓總統與以巴領袖溝通的過程中,也充斥著各方因國內政治利益考量下,而片面妨礙和平進程的挑釁作為。 在分析柯林頓政府所運用的調停策略,並配合檢視以巴的談判策略,可看出三方都有誤判形勢以致做出錯誤的決策,並共同該負擔和平失敗的責任。在以巴皆試圖壓縮對手並拉攏美國的情況下,柯林頓政府未能擺出強硬的姿態來督促雙方實踐和平協議,放任強硬份子輕易地找到藉口破壞和平。美國未能掌握調停的時間表,導致最具爭議性的耶路撒冷主權以及巴人回歸問題,在缺乏充分討論與互相了解下,倉促在最後關頭要求以巴雙方立刻解決,更是談判無法獲得共識的主因。柯林頓總統之立場也有失調停者該力求的中立態度,而與以色列較為友善,同時也未協助巴人爭取更合理之生活環境,導致以色列的違約行為一再得以重複,而巴人也將反以情緒轉嫁至美國身上。柯林頓政府未能掌握良機,而讓以巴和平轉變成暴力收場,實乃策略錯誤所造成之大憾。

關鍵字

柯林頓 調停 以巴和談

並列摘要


The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the strategy which Clinton administration had taken while mediating Israeli-Palestinian talks. The conflict between Israel and Palestine has gradually become the core issue of the Middle East disturbance. The U.S. found two of her national interests in the Middle East colliding, and the best way to both support Israel and promote good tie with Arab nations, is dissolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Clinton Administration enjoyed the best opportunity to reach a permanent peace agreement. The Camp David Summit in 2000 was the talk the nearest to the final peace, however; peace didn’t succeed. Clinton Administration started the first term as a facilitator. As the Oslo framework slowly proceeded, Clinton became a mediator who dominated the peace process. During the process of mediation, right wing hardliners of both Israel and Palestine constantly provoked against each. Conflict arose from time to time as a result. Even the political leaders of both sides enjoyed games of provocation in order to please each own constituency. Clinton Administration made several strategic mistakes. By investigating the negotiation strategy that Israel and Palestine took, it is clear that both sides including the U.S. should share responsibility for the failure of peace process. While Israel and Palestine competed against each and both tried to win the U.S. endorsement, Clinton failed to take a hard position on restraining both from violating peace process, which led to a vicious circle of deal breaking. Extremists could therefore easily find their actions influential. On top of that, Clinton Administration did not expedite the time frame of peace talk. Instead, the U.S. left the most controversial issues of Jerusalem and refuge return under little discussion or mutual understanding until the 2000 final status talk, which further sentenced the death of peace deal. Moreover, Clinton Administration was not a neutral mediator, but more clinging to Israel and ignoring the endurance of Palestinians. Such a position introduced more Israeli unilateral violation and lost favor from Palestinians. Miscalculation and wrong strategy deployment turned a possible peace deal into another violence cycle.

並列關鍵字

Clinton mediate Israeli-Palestinian talks

參考文獻


U.S. Department of State Dispatch, 1990-2000.
Goldberg, David Howard. Foreign Policy and Ethnic Interesting Group: American and Canadian Jews Lobby for Israel. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990.
Hudson, Michael C., ed. The Palestinian: New Directions. Washington DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1990.
Lewicki, Roy J. ,ed. Think Before You Speak. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1996.
Maoz, Moshe. Syria and Israel: From War to Peace Making. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.

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陳翼均(2011)。聯合國在巴勒斯坦問題中的角色之研究:(1947-2010)〔碩士論文,淡江大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2011.00387
曾冠詒(2009)。兩岸簽署和平協議之研究〔碩士論文,淡江大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2009.01290

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