核心代理問題對薪酬績效敏感性之影響-以薪酬委員會為調節效果

本研究之目的係探討核心代理問題對薪酬績效敏感性之影響，並進一步檢測兩者間的關係是否會受到薪酬委員會的調節。本研究以2012年至2016年為研究期間，研究對象為我國上市電子業公司。實證結果指出核心代理問題(股份控制權與盈餘分配權的偏離)愈高會使薪酬績效敏感性下降。另外，本研究五項薪酬委員會品質特性(薪酬委員會委員之董事年資、薪酬委員會規模、每年開會次數、委員出席率與獨立董事比例）愈高，無法使薪酬績效敏感性增強。最後，本研究亦發現，當薪酬委員會品質愈高，有助於降低核心代理問題對薪酬績效敏感性之影響。

關鍵字

核心代理問題；薪酬績效敏感性；薪酬委員會

並列摘要

The objective of this study is to discuss relationship between core agency problem and pay-performance sensitivities, and further examine whether the relationship is mediated by compensation committee. In this study we used public listed electronics industry in Taiwan as our study sample and our sample period is from 2012 to 2016. The results found that core agency problem more higher (the controlling shareholder with excess control rights) will reduce pay-performance sensitivities. In addition, The study of the five quality of compensation committee characteristics (directors’ seniority, size of compensation committee, frequency of meetings, members attendance rate and proportion of independent directors) with a high quality will not be stronger to pay-performance sensitivities. At last, the higher the quality of the compensation committee will reduce the impact of core agency problem on pay-performance sensitivities.