在考慮外溢效果下 R&D政策確定與不確定對廠商的影響

The impact of uncertainty and spillovers on the direction of R&D policy

林士全(Shih-Chuan Lin)

指導教授 ： 麥朝成

淡江大學/商學院/產業經濟學系碩士班/碩士(2008年)

https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2008.00410

摘要

本論文延伸Spencer與Brander(1983)的模型架構，考慮在有外溢效果下，政策確定與不確定，以及有市場需求不確定性發生時，對廠商的行為有何影響，和政府的R&D政策為何。我們發現在考慮外溢效果下，且政府的R&D補貼政策為確定時，當外溢效果不夠大時，政府的最適R&D政策為補貼；當外溢效果夠大時，最適政策要看不同效果的相對重要程度而定。當政府的R&D政策有不確定性，且廠商的R&D支出水準為策略互補下，此政策不確定性增加時，會減少兩家廠商的R&D支出水準。當市場需求有不確定性，且廠商的R&D支出水準為策略互補下，此需求不確定性增加時，會增加兩家廠商的R&D支出水準，且當外溢效果不夠大時，政府會採取何種政策則無法得知；當外溢效果夠大時，最適政府政策要看不同效果的相對重要程度而定。

關鍵字

外溢效果 ； 不確定性 ； Cournot數量競爭 ； R&D ； 產業政策

並列摘要

This paper extends the Brander-Spencer (1983) model by certainty considering R&D spillovers. We examine the impacts of R&D spillover on firms’ choices of strategic variables under R&D policy with and/or without un/certainty is well as market demand uncertainty. We show that both R&D spillovers and the type of uncertainties are important in affecting the direction of optimal R&D policy when firms engage in international R&D competition. When the type of uncertainty is policy uncertainty, increasing uncertainty will reduce firms’ R&D level in the case of strategic complements. With demand uncertainty, however, firms’ R&D levels in the case of strategic complements are increasing as long as the uncertainty is increasing. When R&D spillover is significant and the strategic effect of subsidy overweight the shift effect of subsidy, then the policy maker will tax the firm 1. When the shift effect of subsidy exceeds the strategic effect of subsidy, the optimal policy is a R&D subsidy.

並列關鍵字

Spillover ； Uncertainty ； Cournot quantity competition ； R&D ； Industrial policy

參考文獻

2. Bagwell, K. and R. W. Staiger (1992), “The sensitivity of strategic and corrective R&D policy in battles for monopoly”, International Economic Review, 33, 795-816

3. Bagwell, K. and R. W. Staiger (1994), “The sensitivity of strategic and corrective R&D policy in oligopolistic industries”, Journal of International Economics, 36, 133-150

4. Brander, J. (1995), “Strategic trade policy”, In: Grossman, G., Rogoff, K. (Eds.), Handbook of International Economics, vol.III, North-Holland, Amsterdam

5. Brander, J. A. and B. J. Spencer (1985), “Export subsidies and international market share rivalry”, Journal of International Economics, 18, 83-100

timarket oligopoly : strategic substitutes and complements”, Journal of Political Economy, 93, 488-511