當前國內外不對稱作戰之論著,未見對不對稱抗衡的本質,及如何達成「以劣勝優、以弱抗強」之原理,進行有系統的研究。本研究透過對軍事哲學、不對稱作戰理論的探索與分析,探尋在敵我實力明顯不對稱的情況下,弱勢一方係如何達成扭轉強弱態勢,迫使強敵退出戰爭甚至猶能獲勝的原理、原則。 經由前述研究,本文計歸納出:爭取物質強弱與心理認知轉換;爭取外部環境與競爭規則轉換;隱匿、滲透與發揮無形影響;於強敵畏懼、不擅長的領域作戰;堅韌持續不畏重大犧牲;避強擊弱,破壞敵戰略意圖;分散式作戰;善用有利地理條件創造不對稱優勢;發展不對稱軍事技術與創新戰法;衡量主客觀條件,擇定不對稱戰略指導與戰法、戰具等十項不對稱作戰原則,如能依循原則、靈活運用,將有助弱勢一方在不對稱戰爭中提升獲勝機率。 本研究並藉國共內戰、越戰、阿富汗戰爭、第一次車臣戰爭、以阿六日戰爭與贖罪日戰爭、科索沃空戰等大量戰例,來檢視、驗證驗證不對稱作戰原則的正確性;另藉由1895年日軍接收臺灣時面臨的乙未戰爭、第二次車臣戰爭、2008年至2021年間多次加薩戰爭、1943年後的太平洋戰爭等負面戰例,探討弱勢一方雖採用不對稱作戰方式,何以仍難逃脫失敗之結局,進而檢討不對稱作戰的侷限因素,如雙方物質力量或海空技術差距過大、弱勢一方無法獲得外援、戰爭涉及強國核心利益、弱國錯誤運用不對稱戰法時,常會導致不對稱作戰失敗;並據以修正前述經由理論研究所歸納的不對稱作戰原則。 最後有關臺海防衛作戰的探討,係將前述不對稱作戰原則、不對稱戰例的研究成果,結合戰略情勢與作戰環境、兩岸國防資源與軍力特性對比及國內外學者專家的建議,提出善用海峽天塹、高度隱蔽及分散式作戰、重層消耗與打擊敵作戰重心─三棲輸具等觀點,並主張平時應致力於強化建軍備戰、提升不對稱戰力,以能在「戰前」扭轉強敵心理認知,使其認為代價過大、勝算不確定,而放棄以戰爭做為解決臺灣問題的手段。
After reviewing the current literature on asymmetric warfare, domestic and abroad, it is hard to conclude a good piece of work that elaborates the essence of asymmetric warfare in a systematic and logical order. By reviewing and analyzing the military philosophy and the theory of asymmetrical warfare, this study intends to conclude some principles under the circumstance with a significant gap between the superior and inferior and how can the inferior reverse the difficult situation of forcing the superior out of the war and even win the final victory. Based on the arguments mentioned above, the study concludes with ten principles which include: to look for the strength of the material and the conversion of psychological cognition; seek external circumstances and competition rules; concealment, infiltrate and exert intangible influence, and conduct the war in areas that frighten the enemy, or they may not good at fighting; perseverance and persistence without the fear of sacrifice; evade the enemy’s superior strength and strike its inferior, sabotage its strategic intention; conduct distributed operation; make good use of geographical conditions to create the asymmetrical advantages; develop asymmetrical military technologies and innovative tactics; considering both subjective and objective conditions, then choose the asymmetrical strategic guidance, tactics and combat equipment. If those principles can be followed and used flexibly, it will help the inferior to improve the chance of winning. The study reexamines several decisive battles to verify the correctness of these asymmetric warfare principles, such as the Chinese Civil War, Vietnam War, War in Afghanistan, the 1st Chechen War, Six-Day War, Yum Kippur War and the Air battle in Kosovo War, etc. In the meantime, the study also reviews the negative examples, which include the 2nd Chechen War, multiple conflicts in the Gaza Strip during 2008-2021 and the Pacific War after 1943, to understand the reason why the inferior adopted the asymmetric tactics but still lose the war. Then the study discusses the limitations of asymmetric warfare, such as the significant gap between both sides in their material strength or naval/air combat skills, and the inferior cannot get foreign military aid. The war involves the core interests of powerful countries; the inferior misuses the asymmetric tactics, which will mostly lead to combat failure. Also, the study revises the asymmetric principles above derived from the theoretical research. In conclusion, regarding the defense operation in Taiwan Strait, by using the result of the asymmetric warfare principles and classic asymmetric battles, combined with the strategic situation, combat environment, the comparison of defense resources and military force characteristics between cross-strait and recommendations from the domestic and foreign scholars, this study concludes several perspectives such as make good use of the strait and natural barrier, high degree of concealment, distributed warfare, gradually depletes the enemy’s combat power and strike its Center of Gravity (COG)-triphibious vehicles, etc. Moreover, the study shows that it is necessary to strengthen the force building and asymmetric capabilities to reverse the enemy’s psychological perception before the war and make the enemy think the cost is too high and their odds are uncertain; therefore, the enemy will not use war as a solution to the Taiwan issue.