勞工參與公司治理和銀行利差決策

本文試圖建立一個選擇權評價模式的理論模型，探討銀行廠商在面對勞工參與公司治理、資本管制及存款利率時，將如何影響銀行最適利差之決策行為。研究發現，當銀行經理人對股東權益報酬的風險認知，是屬於相對低風險的狀態下，透過勞工參與公司治理程度增加，將導致銀行最適利差降低。因此得知，員工干預公司經營時，將導致銀行獲利減少，隱含著工會的群眾力量不能代表專業化管理，勞工應尊重經理人專業的決策，減少其干預。當銀行經理人對股東權益報酬的風險認知，是屬於相對高風險的狀態下，透過金融管理當局增加資本管制，將導致銀行最適利差增加，因此得知，提高資本管制不但可使銀行獲利增加，進而達到金融穩定的效果。而當銀行有能力同時決定市場的存放款利率時，在策略性替代下，銀行將會降低存款利率，達到獲利增加的效果。

關鍵字

銀行最適利差；勞工心聲；資本管制

並列摘要

This paper demonstrates how labor voice and capital regulation jointly determine the bank’s optimal interest margin decision. Our theoretical model is based on a regime giving corporate governance power to current labor and then labor’s objective is equivalent to minimizing the equity value of the put option. Our model show that an increase in the labor voice in corporate governance decreases the bank’s optimal interest margin in the put-option valuation when the bank realizes a relatively less risky state of the world. Labor shouldn’t interfere with bank’s strategy. However, our model also shows that an increase in the capital-to-deposits ratio increases the bank’s optimal interest margin when the bank realizes a relatively more risky state. Enhancing capital regulation can achieve finance stable.

並列關鍵字

Bank Interest Margin ； Labor Voice ； Capital Regulation

參考文獻

陳怡蓁(2006)，「好天氣認知行為模式與最適放款利率－選擇權評價分析」，淡江大學國際企業學研究所碩士論文。

Baltensperger, E. (1980) “Alternative Approaches to the Theory of the Banking Firm,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 6, 1, 1-37.

Black, F., and M. Scholes (1973) “The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities,”Journal of Political Economy, 81, 2, 637-659.

Bulow, J. I., J. D. Geanakoplos, and P. D. Klemperer (1985) “Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements,” Journal of Political Economy, 93, 3, 488-511.

Chan, Y. S., S. I. Greenbaum, and A. V. Thakor (1986) “Information Reusability, Competition, and Bank Asset Quality,” Journal of Banking and Finance, 10, 2, 243-53.

國際替代計量

勞工參與公司治理和銀行利差決策

全文下載

主題瀏覽