摘要
Thakor (2005)所發表的文章 “Do Loan Commitments Cause Overlending?”，主要是在探討銀行的放款承諾是否會造成過度放款的相關問題。然而，該篇著作所得到的結論為，當在整體經濟是處於一個經濟繁榮期時，銀行的放款承諾是會造成過度放款的問題。本文是從銀行機構的角度進行探討，故不同於Thakor (2005)所探討的經濟週期的宏觀經濟條件。而本文旨在探討當銀行對於其權益報酬風險認知的不確定性，以及運用內部及外部資金來進行銀行的放款承諾，是否也會造成銀行過度放款的問題。 在此種觀點本文提出，若銀行真的發生過度放款的情況，風險認知從微觀的權益風險認知轉換成宏觀的經濟週期，會造成銀行經營更無效率。本文的結論指出，在低度風險狀態時，放款承諾是有可能造成銀行過度放款的情況發生，故銀行必須審慎地檢視放款承諾借款人的財務背景及還款能力，否則將會使信用過度擴張，導致銀行有發生財務危機的風險。
並列摘要
Do loan commitments cause overlending? Thakor (2005) argues that the answer is positive during economic booms. Our paper uses a micro-level economic risk realization, unlike the paper Thakor (2005) used before. Under this view, if there is real overlending, realization switched to the business cycle from the equity return risk could lead to large bank inefficiencies. The conclusion is if the bank is in a less risky state of the world, loan commitments will cause overlending. Under this view, our paper offer some suggestions to bank managers, in order to avoid the highly credit expansion and financial losses.