健康保險契約上的訊息不對稱問題研究

本文比較日額型與實支實付型住院健康險上的訊息不對稱問題，結果顯示，被保險人的職業等級是有價值的隱藏訊息。職業等級較高的被保險人，醫療險出險的機率及出險頻率皆較高。在保險購買意願上，職業等級較高的被保險人，在日額型商品顯現較高的購買意願、所購買的保障較高，因此，職業等級較高的被保險人，在日額型商品中，可能較有逆選擇或道德危險問題出現；然而，職業等級較高的被保險人，在實支實付型商品則顯現較低的購買意願，因此，保險公司的實支實付型商品，在職業等級較低的被保險人，可能出現有利選擇的現象。

關鍵字

健康保險；隱藏訊息；有利選擇；逆選擇；道德危險；職業等級

並列摘要

The thesis compares the type of fixed daily hospital benefit insurance and the type of full medical expense reimbursement insurance to explore the asymmetric information problems in hospitalization health insurance. The result of empirical analysis finds that occupational classification is valuable hidden information. The insured with higher career risk rating, whose probability and frequency of claims are both higher. In purchase intention for health insurance, the insured with higher career risk rating shows higher purchase intension in daily hospital benefit insurance, and the amount of coverage which they purchase is higher. Therefore, when the insured with higher career risk rating in daily hospital benefit insurance, adverse selection problems or moral hazard problems are more likely to occur. However, the insured with higher career risk rating shows lower purchase intension in full medical expense reimbursement insurance. Therefore, when the insured with lower career risk rating in full medical expense reimbursement insurance, advantageous selection may occur.