董事長兼任總經理會影響財務報導品質？兼論企業生命週期之影響

本文旨在探討當企業發生董事長兼任總經理之行為時，其董總同一人之兼任行為對於代理成本與監督職能之影響，並探討是否會導致財務報導品質降低。根據相關文獻指出，當企業處於不同之商業環境下對於代理成本與監督職能要求皆不相同。因此，本文透過修正後Jones Model觀察當董事長兼任總經理時，代理成本與監督職能是否會影響企業之財務報導品質，並以Dickinson(2011)之企業生命週期衡量不同之商業環境。結果顯示，當企業處於不同企業生命週期時，若有董事長兼任總經理之行為，對於代理成本與監督職能會有不同之影響。其中，以股利發放率衡量代理成本時，結果發現成長期時會以裁決性應計數操弄盈餘向上；成熟期時會利用過度生產存貨與異常裁決性費用進行實質盈餘管理。以營業費用率衡量時，發現動盪期之企業會操弄裁決性應計數向上；成長期與動盪期之企業，會有利用過度生產存貨之方式操弄會計數字。於資產週轉率方面，初始期之企業會以過度生產進行實質盈餘管理；最後，本研究發現當董事長兼任總經理且企業生命週期為衰退期時，會利用放方寬信用條件之方式進行盈餘管理。希冀透過本文之實證結果，提供主管機關、企業及其利害關係人，有關企業治理政策之設置及參考依據。

關鍵字

企業生命週期；代理成本；監督職能；董事長兼任總經理；盈餘管理

並列摘要

The purpose of this study was to examine whether the influence of CEO duality on agency costs and the function of supervision reduces financial reporting quality. A review of relevant literature revealed that the requirements that businesses have for agency costs and the function of supervision vary with the commercial environment. Modified Jones model were employed to measure how CEO duality influence agency costs and the function of supervision, and Dickinson’s (2011) firm life cycle was used to define different commercial environments. The results indicate that CEO duality will influence agency costs and the function of supervision in different life cycle. When the agency cost is measured by the dividend payout ratio, growth stages will increase earnings by discretionary accruals; Mature stages will increase earnings by overproduction and abnormal discretionary expenses. When measured by the operating expense ratio, it is found that decline stages will manipulate earnings through discretionary accruals; Growth stages will influence the accounting figures by overproduction. In terms of asset turnover ratio, it is discovery that Intro stages will manipulate earnings by overproduction; Finally, this study found out that decline stages will influence their earnings through extend the limitation of credit policy. It is hoped that the empirical results of this study can serve as reference for authorities, businesses, and stakeholders regarding corporate governance policies.