寡占競爭與最適技術授權

Optimal Licensing in a Cournot Duopoly Model

鄭光哲(Kuang-Che Cheng)

指導教授 ： 鄭東光

淡江大學/商學院/經濟學系碩士班/碩士(2007年)

https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2007.00818

摘要

本文利用成本差異、Cournot競爭的架構，分別從權利金收益及社會福利的角度，探討降幅型研發與非降幅型研發下，產業外研發單位的最適授權機制。可能的授權方式有三：次高價格密價拍賣、固定權利金與單位權利金。
　　本文發現，如果產業外研發單位以權利金收益為考量，最適授權方式難以從一而論；基本上要依成本的降幅、授權前成本差異的程度而定。非降幅型研發若能改善所有廠商的成本，則最適授權方式為次高價格密價拍賣，但若只能改善技術劣勢廠商的位成本，則最適授權方式為固定權利金。
　　如果以社會福利為考量，不論是降幅型或非降幅型研發，只要能改善所有廠商的成本，最適授權方式都是固定權利金；但若非降幅型研發只能改善技術劣勢廠商的成本，則最適授權方式為單位權利金。

關鍵字

Cournot競爭 ； 研發 ； 最適專利授權

並列摘要

This article studies the optimal licensing mechanism of an outside patent-holder from a point of view of the patent-holder’s profit or social welfare, in a cost differentiated、Cournot duopoly model. We consider two types of cost reducing innovation: “cost-cut” and “non cost-cut”; and three types of patent licensing: second-price sealed-bid auction, fixed-fee franchising or royalty.
With the view of maximizing the patent-holder’s profit, it is found that the optimal licensing policy of cost-cut innovation varies with the degree of cost differentiation and the extent of cost-cut. The optimal licensing policy of non cost-cut innovation improving all firms’ cost is second-price sealed-bid auction, but the optimal licensing policy is fixed-fee if the non cost-cut innovation can only improve the cost of the less efficient firm.
To maximize social welfare, the optimal licensing policy is fixed-fee if the innovation can improve all firms’ cost no matter whether it is cost-cut or non cost-cut innovation. However the optimal licensing policy is royalty if the non cost-cut innovation improves only the cost of the less efficient firm.

並列關鍵字

Cournot Competition ； R&D ； Optimal Patent Licensing

參考文獻

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Rockett, K.E., 1990. Choosing the Competition and Patent Licensing. Rand Journal of Economics, 21(1), 161-171.

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