本研究主要係以董事會結構中之獨立董事比例、董事會開會次數以及董事持股比例探討董事會結構與財務危機之關聯性,並兼論董事長兼任總經理對董事會結構變數與財務危機關聯性之調節效果。本研究以 2010年至 2020 年間臺灣上市櫃公司發生財務危機者為研究對象,並以配對樣本方法,共計蒐集241筆資料。實證結果顯示,獨立董事比例與財務危機呈不顯著負相關;董事會開會次數與財務危機呈顯著正相關,表示董事會開會次數愈多,企業發生財務危機之可能性愈高;而董事持股比例與財務危機呈不顯著正相關。另外在董事長兼任總經理之調節效果方面,研究結果指出在董事長兼任總經理之情況下,獨立董事比例與公司發生財務危機之可能性呈現顯著負相關,董事長兼任總經理對於獨立董事比例與發生財務危機之關聯性具有調節效果。本研究實證結果與代理理論及公司治理藍圖發展方向相符,若公司有董事長兼任總經理之情形,將削弱董事會監督力,故應安排其他措施加強董事會監督職能。
This study examines the effects of board structure, including independent directors, board meeting times, and director shareholding on financial distress. This study further investigates the moderating effects of CEO duality on the relationships between board structure and financial distress. We collect data from Taiwan listed companies with financial distress from 2010 to 2020, and match with the normal company. Finally, our sample consists of 241 observations. The empirical results demonstrate that board meeting times have a significantly positively influence on financial distress, so the companies with more board meeting times are more likely to have financial distress. Our results also indicate the moderating effects of CEO duality, when CEO duality exists independent directors are negatively significant on financial distress. The results are consistent with agency theory and the development goal of corporate governance. When CEO duality exists, it is necessary to strengthen the intensity of board monitoring through other mechanisms.