資產減損與裁決性應計項目之關聯性： 以美國財務會計準則No. 144為例

The association between asset write-offs and discretionary accruals: Evidence from the U.S.

陳韻如(Yun-Ju Chen)

指導教授 ： 曹嘉玲

淡江大學/管理學院/會計學系碩士班/碩士(2008年)

https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2008.01061

摘要

美國發布財務會計準則公報第144號” 長期性資產及待處分長期性資產減損之會計處理”(SFAS No. 144)。本研究首先檢驗盈餘管理動機下（例如洗大澡與盈餘平穩化），SFAS No. 144資產減損損失與裁決性應計項目間的關係。研究結果發現公司同時使用SFAS No. 144資產減損損失與裁決性應計項目的行為確實與盈餘管理有關。特別是在盈餘平穩化下，管理當局會藉由提列SFAS No. 144資產減損損失及裁決性應計項目來達到盈餘下修之目的。另外，本研究也針對在加入公司治理變數後對盈餘管理之影響。實證結果顯示，當公司治理機制越強，越可以抑制管理當局使用SFAS No. 144資產減損損失及裁決性應計項目來進行洗大澡及盈餘平穩化的行為。

關鍵字

144號公報 ； 盈餘管理 ； 公司治理 ； 裁決性應計項目

並列摘要

The Financial Accounting Standards Board issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 144, “Accounting for the Impairment or Disposal of Long-Lived Assets” in 2002. This study examines whether earnings management incentives affect the association between the amount of assets impairment loss and discretionary accruals. This paper also aims to explore whether corporate governance affect the association between asset write-offs and concurrent discretionary accruals. Empirical results document that this association are subject to earrings management motives. Specifically, for “big bath” and “income smoothing” firms, managers tend to manage the earnings downward by the magnitude of asset write-offs and discretionary accruals. Additional analyses reveal that strong governance mechanisms have a higher propensity to constrain managers to engage in earnings management activities, namely “big bath” and income smoothing behaviors

並列關鍵字

SFAS No. 144 ； earnings management ； corporate governance ； discretionary accruals

參考文獻

楊朝旭、吳幸蓁，2007，資產減損之動機與資訊後果：論公司治理之角色。2007會計理論與實務研討會，台北大學。

Abbott, L. J., S. Parker, and G.F. Peters. 2002. Audit committee characteristics and financial misstatement: A study of the efficiency of certain Blue Ribbon committee recommendations. Unpublished manuscript.

Ashbaugh, H., R. Lafond, and B. W. Mayhew. 2003. Do Nonaudit Services Compromise Auditor Independence? Further Evidence. The Accounting Review 78(3):611-639.

Bartov, E. 1993. The Timing of Asset Sales and Earnings Manipulation. The Accounting Review 68 (4):840-855.

Beasley, M., 1996. An Empirical Analysis between the Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement fraud. The Accounting Review 71(4): 443-466.