正當性訊號和旁觀者效應對獎酬回饋式群眾募資案之影響

How do legitimate signals and bystander effect affect the results of reward-based crowdfunding projects?

周文卿(Chou Wen-Ching)

指導教授 ： 于卓民 ； 黃國峯

國立政治大學/商學院/企業管理學系/博士(2021年)

https://doi.org/10.6814/NCCU202101456

摘要

由群眾外包模式而來，群眾募資為近來方興未艾之新興小額網路募款模式，許多學者紛紛開始探討影響群眾募資成功之因素。群眾募資其中的一種樣態為獎酬回饋，在獎酬回饋式的群眾募資平台上，專案的支持者，甚或提案者，都是較沒有經驗或專業知識的小額出資者。因此，雙方之間存在的資訊不對稱，比其他樣態的群眾募資平台更為嚴重。在群眾募資期間，專案支持者必須接受到多樣的具正當性的訊號，以利他們做更好的判斷，提高專案成功的可能性。另外，一群對專案有興趣但卻還沒實際出資的旁觀者們，也需要時間去評估其他人的作為，因此，專案提案者必須思考如何降低旁觀者效應對群眾募資案的不良影響。因此，本論文基於此，進行三個研究試圖探討專案提案者可提出那些具正當性且適時的訊號，降低資訊不對稱和旁觀者效應，使群募專案較容易成功。
本論文第二章說明第一個研究，研究發現來自於專案內容、專案提案者特色、第三方之多重的正當性訊號有助於群募專案成功，例如提出多樣的專案贊助選項、與社群平台建立連結以強化網絡外部性效果、強調提案者本身來自於新創團體、提案者本身已有群眾募資的成功經驗、專案於群募網站首頁輪播、或在首頁的編輯精選中出現等具正當性的訊號。第三章呈現第二個研究，研究分析後發現，旁觀者效應減少專案的每日募資金額。然而，機構單位提出的群眾募資專案，因其正當性，可降低旁觀者效應對每日募資金額的負面影響。另外，當專案設定的募款天數愈多時，也可以降低旁觀者效應對每日募資金額的負面影響。第四章呈現第三個研究，分析結果發現專案提案者應注意每日旁觀者比例的變化幅度，變化幅度太大不利於提案成功。專案提案者或平台管理者應適時發送專案進度報告或運用社群媒體轉發專案相關訊息，而且在整個募資期間需做好社會性影響的管理機制。
本論文提出正當性訊號和旁觀者效應對獎酬式群眾募資計畫的影響，尤其是在一個對大眾公開的更吵雜的環境裡。本研究並提供此一新興現象未來跨領域於社會心理學與策略創業之研究方向與可能性。本論文對募資者也有參考價值，募資者可思考如何以合理的成本增進群眾對社群的參與度。未來研究者可進一步分析發送那些具社會性影響力的正當性訊號，以降低旁觀者效應。

關鍵字

訊號理論 ； 正當性 ； 旁觀者效應 ； 社會影響 ； 獎酬回饋式群眾募資

並列摘要

Rooted in crowdsourcing, crowdfunding is a new and developing phenomenon and scholars have demonstrated the impacts of different success factors on crowdfunding project success. In reward-based crowdfunding context, potential backers are less sophisticated and they tend to contribute much smaller amount in comparison with other types of crowdfunding. Potential project backers are troubled by the problem of information asymmetry and need more time to evaluate whether to make pledges by receiving multiple legitimate signals and observing the behavior of the “crowds.” The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the impacts of multiple legitimate signals and bystander effect to reward-based crowdfunding projects in a high-noise environment.
In chapter two, I find multiple legitimate signals sent from project itself, project creators, and third-party could increase the propensity of a project’s success. Multiple legitimate signals include providing more reward options, establishing social network connections, showing creator’s past funding success, project creator being a start-up team, and project being displayed on the banner slider or editor’s select section on the crowding platform frontpage. In chapter three, co-authors and I show that the bystander effect harms the daily pledge amount. To mitigate such a negative impact, crowdfunding project creators may signal project legitimacy and use a longer project-funding period to escalate the conversion from bystanders to backers, which in turn enhances the fundraising performance.
Finally, I further examine the bystander effect during the entire fundraising cycle in chapter four. The results show that a smaller fluctuation of the bystander effect changes during the entire fundraising cycle is positively related to the propensity of the project success. Adaptable legitimate signals such as project updates or information cascades could alleviate the social inhibition of helping in the middle of the fundraising cycle. Project creators shall pay close attention in managing social influence tactics along the entire project campaign.
This dissertation suggests that legitimate signals and bystander effect affect reward-based crowdfunding project success, especially when problems linger out in the open to everyone’s noisy online and offline fundraising environment. Future studies should continue focusing on discovering the interaction of social psychology and strategic entrepreneurship contexts and on what legitimate signals of social influences could alleviate bystander effect of this emerging and promising phenomenon.

並列關鍵字

signaling theory ； legitimacy ； bystander effect ； social influence ； reward-based crowdfunding

參考文獻

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