保險監理對保險創新影響之理論探討 —基於大陸互聯網保險之觀察

Navigating the Theoretical Maze of the Interrelationships between Insurance Regulation and Insurance Innovation —Based on a Snapshot of Chinese Mainland’s Online Insurance Development

孫群(Sun Qun)

指導教授 ： 林建智 ； 彭金隆

國立政治大學/商學院/風險管理與保險學系/博士(2022年)

https://doi.org/10.6814/NCCU202201668

摘要

現今，金融與科技並轡而行，以互聯網為代表的電子技術與資訊技術重塑金融的邏輯架構與市場功能，引領金融朝著移動化、網路化、自動化、智慧化、數位化方向發展。此背景下，中國大陸互聯網保險衝破傳統保險業的慣性發展軌道，一路風起雲湧。相較於發達國家各企業致力於移動互聯網、巨量資料、雲服務等技術端口之研發，大陸互聯網保險市場則是另闢蹊徑，在科技金融應用端口層面遙遙領先，呈現「應用端口高轉化率與高採納率」之雙重特徵，路徑迥異但依舊成果豐碩，若細加探究，則可發現前述發展相當程度上有賴於政府引領及政策傾斜。一言以蔽之，互聯網保險「中國模式」背後是自成一體的互聯網保險監理之「中國模式」。
相較其他國家和地區而言，大陸監理機構對互聯網保險發展具有如下獨特的推動優勢：極高風險與合規容錯度、績效導向的務實精神、關鍵時期超強的反思勇氣與糾錯能力、強大的社會動員能力。
研究繼而以大陸互聯網保險監理之「中國模式」「何以如是」作為進一步分析之起點。保險監理屬性使然，任一監理政策之抉擇均是政治制度與社會制度共同作用之結果。為此，研究通過文獻研究、系統研究、比較研究與案例研究等方法，構建了以政治權力說為框架，以政府過程理論為主線，以社會資本理論、計畫行為理論、建構主義理論等社會學說為輔線之研究範式，並得出如下結論：監理者社會資本與監理政治權力結構影響保險監理決策容錯度，進而影響其對市場創新之態度與市場創新之發展。具體言之，大陸監理者何以能充分展現創新寬容立場，答案在於大陸監理者之絕對支配力，該支配力之直接成因在於：大陸問責機制弱，政治與社會領域對大陸監理決策容錯程度相對較高。而大陸政治與社會領域對大陸保險監理決策之高容錯度即大陸互聯網保險應用創新蓬勃發展之主因。
大陸當前監理政治格局自有其歷史、制度與過程邏輯，三者共同構成了大陸監理者絕對支配力的深層次原因。歷史邏輯層面，其一，大陸保險監理權力始終未突破行政權力框架。其二，大陸保險市場一度非自然演進，政府「政治權力資本」易與保險機構「經濟權力資本」結盟，甚至在某些時刻吸納後者以服務特定政策目的。其三，保險監理體制變遷過程鮮見社會互動，社會性權力始終未得重視。前述三大特質相因相生，均有其歷史邏輯之必然。
制度邏輯層面，若聚焦監理決策管理主體，則行政主體中心範式下，大陸保險監理管理權力關係彙集成兩條主線，一為「黨政」關係主線，二為「政法」關係主線。在「黨政」關係方面，當前制度下，監理機構執行性行政權力得到統治性政治權力之掩護。政法關係方面，代表兼職性、決策機制困境、監督間接性與滯後性均導致人大對監理機構決策政令的違憲監督與實質審查付之闕如。另，大陸行政訴訟法內容單薄、行政訴訟範圍狹窄，多數抽象行政行為存在於大陸司法監督的視野盲區之中，損及司法監督的效力與權威。若聚焦監理決策參與主體，則參與主體主要有三，產業利益團體、協會型利益集團與公益型利益集團。傳統產業團體中諸多保險機構自國家機關演化而來，慣於尋求「行政監護」。新興產業團體因社會內部分化較低，鮮少採用西方「壓力」式利益表達路徑。協會型利益集團更多展現出監理機構與保險市場的協調性力量。公益型利益集團行政化趨勢令社會權力精英慢慢演化為行政管理精英中的一份子，阻滯消費者領域內社會權力的精英化演進，而缺少精英代表的消費者權力則又回歸「原子化」原始權力狀態。因此，當前體制框架與權力定勢下，經濟權力與社會權力具有高度制度遵循傾向，對監理機構行政權力存在一定依附屬性。
過程邏輯層面，大陸監理博弈過程與決策過程均進一步鞏固了監理機構之支配力。傳統利益集團深受政治系統影響，被動響應居多，新型產業主體則主要呈現出試圖迎合監理喜好又回避監理底線要求的犬儒主義行為風格。至於消費者，因其非集團性政治力量，其基礎性、社會性、原子化的個體權力易被邊緣化。相較之下，監理機構權力集中度最高，是監理政策「權力場」中的實際立法者、執法者、最大利益集團與行動集團。是以，大陸「小人大、小司法、大政府」政治格局可謂名副其實，而大陸獨特的二元管理體制與國家權力委託代理關係堪稱造就這一政治格局的關鍵肇因。
大陸決策制度設計初衷雖好，但制度有瑕，且現實運作過程尚存在諸多十分明顯之問題，然而大陸監理決策制度卻異常穩定，除權力歸屬與運作之外，其背後尚有更具隱蔽性之社會性影響因素，即監理機構社會資本，其以權威的高度生產性效應成為銘刻於決策制度架構之中的特殊法則，助益大陸監理者與產業團體及消費者形成具有大陸特色且相對特殊之互動，進而企及合法性、專業性、問責性、程式正當性與有效性等五項「監理良治」標準。
本研究就「政治權力配置、監理決策容錯程度、保險創新動力」三者之間的關係初步得到如下命題：「監理決策容錯程度→保險創新動力」層面：（1）應用創新越繁榮，說明監理寬容度越高，反之亦然，兩者呈正相關關係。（2）應用創新越繁榮，說明監理決策容錯度越高，反之亦然，兩者呈正相關關係。另，「政治權力配置→監理決策容錯程度」層面：（1）監理部門政治力量越強，監理越寬容，反之亦然，兩者呈正相關關係。（2）決策問責機制越弱，監理部門政治力量越強，反之亦然，兩者呈負相關關係。（3）決策問責機制越弱，監理決策容錯程度越高，反之亦然，兩者呈負相關關係。（4）應用創新越繁榮，說明監理決策問責機制越弱，反之亦然，兩者呈負相關關係。日本、臺灣、新加坡等地實踐之經驗觀察對前述命題提供了進一步佐證。
研究具有如下貢獻：實踐意義層面，研究以本土價值觀為基點，歸納大陸互聯網保險發展模式與監理模式特徵，並追蹤其形成進程，對其監理體系高容錯度的個性特徵與背後成因進行總結與重點探討，爭取將大陸式互聯網保險監理這一實務管理符號轉變為理論研究的學術文化符號，以便於境內外監理者理解、參鑒。理論意義層面，研究作為大陸互聯網保險監理與創新關係的專項研究以及大陸互聯網保險監理體制與過程的專項研究，高度重視研究範式之整合，以「監理－政治－社會」的複調範式框架考察大陸特定政治、社會現象，拼合與西方理論迥異的大陸監理與創新現象的前因後果，揭示大陸獨特監理邏輯，為互聯網金融創新之研究開闢了新研究視野。在具體研究過程中，研究嘗試思考各理論體系的交疊空間，為不同理論之間的交流對話乃至貫通融合容留可能性，探索既有監理理論補強空間，為分析範式之發展做出了有益嘗試。另一方面，研究為政治權力說在新時代之發展提供了相應實踐證據，蘊含一定理論價值，同時，政府監理議題本身也將賦予社會資本理論與建構主義理論更多可適用之場合，可為相關學術討論容留相應社會人文空間。

關鍵字

保險監理 ； 保險創新 ； 互聯網保險 ； 政治權力說 ； 政府過程 ； 社會資本

並列摘要

In the aftermath of the financial calamity in 2008, there has been a burgeoning of electronic and information technology represented by the internet with the whole world showing signs of being overwhelmed, which reshapes the logical structure and market functions of finance, leading finance to develop in the direction of being mobile, networked, automated, intelligent and digitalized. Against this backdrop, Chinese mainland has now become important forces to be reckoned with in the sphere of online insurance, where the online insurance industry provides more panoramic, professional, differentiated and highly efficient client service which the consumers would otherwise fail to obtain under the circumstances of traditional insurance business. Compared to developed countries, where companies are committed to the research and development of technology such as mobile internet, big data and cloud services, the online insurance market of Chinese mainland has taken a different path and is far ahead in the application of these technologies in financial areas, showing the dual characteristics of “high technology conversion rate and high application adoption rate”, a very different but still fruitful development path that can be encapsulated in a term “Chinese Model”, the linchpin of which, behind the scenes, points further to regulator's leadership on the Chinese mainland.
Four fundamental and defining features could be distinguished that make Chinese mainland’s regulation different from other regions, including high risk and compliance tolerance, performance-oriented pragmatism, strong error recovery ability and strong social mobilization power.
This study then takes these features as the starting point to search for profoundly delicate clues about the understandably crucial determinants which manage to mould Chinese mainland’s regulatory approach. Anyway, insurance regulation is such a dynamic complicated process involving multilevel and multidimensional actions (in particular with respect to political and social actions) that long gone are the days when a single analysis framework could paint a complete picture about it. Thence the study avails itself of a comprehensive research paradigm and reveals that the high degree of fault tolerance for insurance regulatory decisions constitutes the main contributor for the flourishing of application innovation of online insurance on the Chinese mainland. The issue thus arises as to the conditions in which such high degree of fault tolerance could persist and ‘work’ to deliver the potential effects outlined above.
Such high degree of fault tolerance on the mainland has its own historical, institutional and process roots. On the historical logic side, firstly, insurance regulation has fallen, and still remains to this day, under the remit of administrative power on the Chinese mainland. Secondly, there presently exists a strong impetus among regulators to align its “political power” with the “economic power” of insurance institutions and even to absorb the latter at certain times to serve specific policy objectives. Thirdly, as the general contour of Chinese mainland’s regulatory architecture evolves, the shaping impact of “social power” may, in many respects, seems obscured.
On the institutional architectural stage, as for political elites in regard to regulation, current party-government regime on the Chinese mainland appears to provide a legitimacy shield that allow regulators sit comfortably alongside decision-making. NPC's supervision beg questions about effectiveness and authority, thus is ill-positioned to challenge regulators. Judicial checks on regulatory power that aim at subjecting regulators to an objective eye, as well, are an added complexity which have not been well developed, let alone widely used. As for regulatory participants, the traditional industry groups, many of which have evolved from state agencies, are wedded to established responses to problems encountered, that is, seeking “administrative guardianship”. The emerging industry groups rarely adopt western “pressure” approach to express their interests because of the low level of social differentiation on the mainland. The discursive-power upon the part of the association interest groups and the public interest groups has been slow to gain traction as the two groups have not been put on an equal footing in negotiations with regulators. These problematic dimensions in regard to regulation, which will unlikely become less convoluted in the near future, prove relatively discouraging and might reduce many parties’ options for enforcing participatory rights, leaving matters of real regulatory substance up to the broad discretions of the regulators.
At the administrative process level, both the game process and the decision-making process within mainland’s regulatory sphere further consolidate the dominance of the regulatory authority. The traditional insurance companies are heavily influenced by the political system and respond passively to the government’s calls, while the new industrial players mainly display a cynical style of behavior that tries to accommodate the supervisory preferences and avoid the bottom line requirements of the regulators. Consumers, with their basic, social and atomized individual power, often keep silent on relevant issues, rendering regulatory activities less accountable. The resulted “small NPC, small judiciary, big government” political pattern leads the regulators to be granted an almost sacrosanct position with regard to decision-making and vested with special powers, such as that of legislators, enforcers, largest interest groups and action groups. And such political pattern is a typical product of the unique dualist management system and the special delegation-agency relationship of state power on the Chinese mainland.
It also should be noted that Chinese mainland’s regulatory regime is particularly potent as the regulators could easily and unconditionally bring the regulated parties to compliance without rebellion, even if sometimes the regulators might fail to perform as well as intended. Several important factors come into play here, including the regulators’ social capital, a centrally important but insufficiently-attended tool capable of defusing relevant suspicions, turning in no small part on the faith on the part of the whole society that is placed in the performance of the regulators and assisting regulators to come to grips with the widely-accepted five benchmarks for regulation.
This study represents an important attempt to journey into the inherently contested terrain, say, the interplay among “political power, fault tolerance towards regulatory decisions, and insurance innovation”, a complicated subject which takes on various shapes if looked at from different angles. It is necessary to recap on these ‘hidden relationships’ and the study arrives at the following preliminary propositions: on the “fault tolerance and innovation relationship” side, ceteris paribus, (1) The more prosperous the application innovation, the higher the regulatory tolerance towards innovation, and vice versa, with a positive correlation between the two. (2) The more prosperous the application innovation, the more tolerant the political and social members towards the regulatory decision errors and vice versa, with a positive correlation between the two. On the “political power and fault tolerance relationship” side, ceteris paribus, (1) The stronger the political power of the regulators, the higher the regulatory tolerance towards innovation, and vice versa, with a positive correlation between the two. (2) The weaker the accountability mechanism for decision-making, the stronger the political power of the regulators, and vice versa, with a negative correlation between the two. (3) The weaker the accountability mechanism for decision-making, the more tolerant the political and social members towards the regulatory decision errors, and vice versa, with a negative correlation between the two. (4) The more prosperous the application innovation, the weaker the accountability mechanism of regulatory decision-making, and vice versa, with a negative correlation between the two. The practices in Japan, Taiwan and Singapore all provide telling examples and could inspire further confidence in the above propositions.
The study has the following research implications: practically, a generally recognized forerunner in tech-based insurance as Chinese mainland is, the systematic analysis on its regulatory mode remains conspicuously barren. This study mainly draws on the Chinese mainland’s experience with due regard to its unique traits, but the aim of the study is to make the analysis relevant to a wider international audience interested in mainland’s practice. It is hoped, therefore, that the analysis offered will be prove useful to add to exchanges between different viewpoints among regulators of different regions. Intellectually, for the currently ever-emerging body of illuminating literature on financial regulation, most of these theories have grown out of western circumstances. But these theories that may have proved successful in western contexts may not necessarily play out in the same way on the Chinese mainland. For that reason, this study attempts to create a new theoretical dimension applicable to mainland’s regulatory issues through a coordinated, comprehensive approach that melds political power theory, social capital theory and constructivism theory into a new coherent package of regulatory theory. Besides, the study also attempts to provide either new material on or new but hard evidence on these theories so as to offer a ‘contemporary story’ about them, hoping to make them more justifiable in the new era.

並列關鍵字

Insurance regulation ； Insurance innovation ； Online insurance ； Political power ； Government process ； Social capital

參考文獻

Keohane, R. O. and J. S. Nye, Power and Interdependence in the Information Age, 77(5) FOREIGN AFFAIRS. 81, 94(1998).

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