我國公股銀行負責人異動與績效之研究

台灣政府所控制經營之公股與泛公股銀行，自2016年以來發生多宗弊案或遭美國主管機關裁罰之案例，然而實際上公股與泛公股銀行層出不窮的受罰案件與弊端，與其績效表現與低逾放比並不相稱。本研究乃由公司治理的角度出發，研究2006年至2016年共11年間，台灣公股與泛公股銀行董事長與總經理的異動，對該銀行財務績效與業務績效所產生的影響，以及現行公股銀行高階管理層派任實務所產生的問題。經迴歸分析後發現 (1)上述高階主管異動對銀行財務績效雖有部分負面影響，但影響並不顯著，僅主管（董事長或總經理）之異動對銀行次年之ROE有負面之顯著影響。 (2)上述高階主管異動對銀行之業務績效並無顯著之影響。　　就上述迴歸分析結果，本研究推測其原因可能為： (1)董事長與總經理背景相似，經營策略多延襲前任、 (2)董事長與總經理異動過於頻繁，且均以守成為主，缺乏中長期規劃、 (3)銀行之經營主力仍以副總經理以下之營運管理階層與中階主管為主，流動性相對較低，故能暫時維繫績效於不墜、 (4)台灣財政部對公股事業負責人之評鑑偏重短期之財務績效數字，不利資本投資與人才培育、(5)董事長與總經理之流動不受旋轉門條款或競業禁止之拘束，經驗之複製與抄襲導致銀行特色與利基逐漸消失。　　綜上所述，本研究認為公股與公股銀行一連串之裁罰事件與弊端，並非單一事件，亦非一朝一夕所致；而企業或銀行的永續經營，首重制度有效性與持續性。最後，公股銀行董事長與總經理，應以事業予以看待，而非職位。

關鍵字

公股銀行；負責人異動；績效；公司治理

並列摘要

The Banks controlled by Taiwan Government have encountered a number of scandals and enforcement actions from either the local or U.S. regulators since year 2016. However, actual performance of these banks is still outstanding despite of those scandals and enforcement actions. The Study reviews the influences on the financial and business performances of these banks after the executive turnovers from 2006 to 2016 and issues arisen from the assignment of executives, from the corporate governance’s point of view. The Study has found through the regression analysis that (i) the negative effect to the financial performances other than the ROE of the next year of these banks are not significant, and (ii) no significant effect to the business performances of these bank is identified. The Study concludes the possible reasons are (i) the backgrounds of those executives are similar and the successors usually follow the strategies of the predecessors, (ii) frequent changes of executives and conservative mindsets keep them from long-term planning, (iii) daily operation of these banks is mainly conducted by the senior executive vice presidents (SEVPs) and middle managements with comparatively low turn-over rate, (iv) short-term financial KPIs set by the Ministry of Finance in Taiwan discourages the executives from capital investment and human resources development, (v) attenuation of niches or characteristic of these banks due to the copycat of strategies resulted from the lack of revolving doors as well as the business strife clauses for these turnovers. In short, the scandals and enforcement actions to the state-owned banks in Taiwan are not single events and are not caused in a short time, either. In addition, the effectiveness and sustainability of corporate governance are the key of the sustainable operation of the banks as well as the corporations. Finally, executives of the state-owned banks should be treated as a “career” instead of the “position”.