策略性下的環境企業社會責任與民營化中立性定理

本文建構一個異質混合的雙占模型，市場中包含一家民營化廠商以及一家民營廠商在該市場進行Cournot數量競爭。兩家廠商皆可以進行策略性地環境企業的社會責任 (Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility, ECSR) 來提高消費者對該企業所生產的產品之願付價格。政府可以透過對兩家廠商每單位的產出水準之補貼政策來矯正市場的扭曲。在這樣的環境下重新探討在最適補貼政策之下社會的福利水準是否會受到民營化程度的影響，也就是民營化中立性定理是否會成立。文中探討兩種階段性的賽局結構，其一為產出決策與ECSR決策同時選擇以及先選擇ECSR決策再選擇產出決策的序列性賽局結構。依據本文的研究結果顯示: 當生產行為不具有外部性時，在最適補貼政策之下，民營化程度的高低並不會影響到社會的福祉，換言之，民營化中立性定理成立；反之，當生產行為具有負的外部性時，民營化程度的高低則會影響到社會的福利水準，也就是說，民營化中立性定理不成立。而上述結果與廠商競爭策略中的ECSR與產出決策為同時決定的賽局結構，抑或是序列性的賽局結構無關。

關鍵字

異質混合寡占；部分民營化；民營化中立性定理；社會企業責任；環境企業社會責任；序列性賽局

並列摘要

This paper constructs a heterogeneous and mixed dual-oligopoly model. The model includes a privatized manufacturer and a private manufacturer to conduct a Cournot quantity competition. Both of them can strategically compete in environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) to increase consumers' willingness to pay for the products made by the company. The government would correct the distortion by subsidizing the output level of the two manufacturers. Under the circumstance, we can re-examine that whether the social welfare level will be affected by the degree of privatization under the optimal subsidy policy, that is, whether the privatization neutrality theorem will be established. This article discusses two phased game structures. One is the sequential game structure where the output and the ECSR decisions are selected simultaneously, the other is ECSR decision is selected first and then the output decision is selected. According to the research results of this paper, we can find that: (1) Under the optimal subsidy policy, when the act of production does not have negative externality, the degree of privatization will not affect the social welfare. In other words, the privatization neutrality theorem established. (2) Under the optimal subsidy policy, when the act of production has a negative externality, the degree of privatization will affect the social welfare level. That is to say, the privatization neutrality theorem does not established. (3) The above results will be equal whether the ECSR and output decisions were made in the same time or in sequential order.