歐盟競爭法下之忠誠折扣——從Intel v. Commission案重新啟航

本文聚焦於歐盟競爭法下之忠誠折扣，試圖藉由歐盟之經驗向競爭主管機關、法院與事業（尤其是獨占事業）提供建議。忠誠折扣乃附條件折扣之一種，其目的在於誘導需求方對己身之忠誠，進而擴大或集中市場需求，最終實現市場力量之維持或強化。鑑於獨占事業之行為可能對市場產生重大影響，且忠誠折扣可能同時產生促進競爭與反競爭效果，如何精準而明快地評估忠誠折扣之違法性乃是競爭法之一大難題。在Intel案之前，歐盟競爭法有關忠誠折扣之分析方法存在割裂，即「基於形式的檢視法」與「基於效果的檢視法」。前者起源於歐盟競爭法之早期案件，形成一套穩定維持的實務見解，後者則起源於執委會於2009年發布之《關於執委會就獨占事業之濫用排他行為適用歐洲共同體條約第82條規定時之執法優先次序指南》，執委會試圖以經濟分析方法革除歐盟競爭法「過於形式化」之弊病。考量忠誠折扣並非必然有害於競爭秩序，兩害相權之下，本文認為「基於效果的檢視法」乃是相對合宜之選擇。然而，將二種檢視法加以揉合，除去「基於形式的檢視法」對反競爭效果之「視為」，此亦不失為一種可行的折衷取徑。在Intel案中，歐盟法院正是採取此種作法，本文認為此將引領歐盟競爭法迎向正確的方向。在歐盟法院作成Intel案判決後，其評估框架在Qualcomm案與Google Android案中得到執委會之遵循，普通法院亦在Intel案更審中遵從歐盟法院之見解。至此，忠誠折扣的形式與效果主義之爭終於在歐盟競爭法上有了止戰的端緒。本文將歐盟競爭法之啟示應用於我國公平會實際執法案例，發現公平會於歷來個案中所表示之觀點流於形式，可能導致積極錯誤，亦無益於效能競爭之維繫。為此，本文歸納歐盟競爭法當前所採之評估框架，希冀能敦促公平會改變其執法方法，建構妥善而完備的審查體系，最終完滿實現維護競爭秩序與促進消費者福祉之重責大任。

關鍵字

歐盟競爭法；濫用獨占地位；忠誠折扣；基於形式的檢視法（以形式作為依據之研究途徑）；基於效果的檢視法（以效果作為依據之研究途徑、更經濟的檢視法）； Intel案；公平交易法

並列摘要

This article focuses on loyalty rebates under EU competition law and attempts to provide recommendations to competition authorities, courts and undertakings (especially dominant undertakings) based on the EU experience. Loyalty rebates are a type of conditional rebates that aims to induce demand-side loyalty in order to expand or stimulate market demand and ultimately to maintain or strengthen the market power of the undertaking granting the rebates. Given that the conduct of a dominant undertaking may have a significant impact on the market, and that loyalty rebates may have both pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects, it is a major challenge for competition law to assess the illegality of loyalty rebates in a precise and expeditious manner. Prior to Intel, there was a fragmentation on the analysis approach to loyalty rebates in EU competition law, namely the “form-based approach” and the “effects-based approach”. The former originated in the early cases of EU competition law and formed a stable set of practical insights, while the latter originated in the “Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 86 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings” published by the Commission in 2009, in which the Commission attempted to eliminate the “over-formalization” of EU competition law by means of economic analysis. Nonetheless, a combination of the two approaches, removing the form-based approach’s unrebuttable presumption of the anti-competitiveness of loyalty-inducing rebates, is also a viable compromise. In Intel, the EU Court of Justice took this approach, and this article argues that this will lead EU competition law in the right direction. Following the ECJ’s Intel judgement, its assessment framework was followed by the Commission in Qualcomm and Google Android, and the General Court, giving a ruling on the referral back in Intel, also followed the ECJ’s approach. At this point, the battle between the “form-based approach” and the “effects-based approach” of loyalty rebates has finally come to a truce in EU competition law. This article applies the insights of EU competition law to the actual enforcement cases of the Fair Trade Commission of Taiwan, and finds that the approach expressed in the FTC’s historical cases is form-based, which may lead to false positives and is not conducive to the maintenance of competition on the merits. To this end, this article concludes the current assessment framework of EU competition law in the hope of urging the FTC to change its enforcement approach and to construct a proper and complete examination system, so as to ultimately fulfill its important responsibility of safeguarding competition order and promoting consumer welfare.

並列關鍵字

EU competition law ； Abuse of dominance/dominant position ； Loyalty/fidelity rebates/discounts ； Form-based/formalistic approach ； Effects-based/more economic approach ； Intel ； Fair Trade Act