無限之蹤跡：列維納斯哲思中的「宗教」

十六世紀以來，於存在論與觀念論哲学的傳承中，用「宗教」一詞示之的事物，被置入於凸顯作為自在且自為之主體的語境裡，從而不斷喪失著其對於人之有限性，以及作為可能性的世界之無限的啟示作用。儘管隨著宗教科學的誕生與其快速發展，訴諸於「宗教」的學術研究活動不斷突破著「猶太-基督宗教傳統」的侷促，但其以「人性」與「社會-文化」為界域的言說方式，並沒有脫離「存在與思之同一」的囹圄。「宗教」對於無限的開啟，處於危機之中。而列維納斯的哲學，以反思近現代西方文明的內在邏輯為歸旨，以存在論與觀念論的共謀為反抗對象，表明：其所詮釋的面向他異性的「宗教」，為走出現代性困境提供了重要資源。質言之，這一哲思的要點有三。第一，首先以「揀選」形態出現的這個「宗教」，揭露了主體的被動性與有限性，重新把人放置於其真正得以現身的充滿他異性的世界中；從而有力地反抗了宣揚自在自為的主體性哲學。第二，於「面容」上的「神顯」，或者說在「面對面」的關係裡，列維納斯以區別神學的「宗教」闡明了對無限與他者的「呼召」，以及其對「自我」的「質問」與「教導」，對於「倫理學」、「形而上學」、「藝術」，乃至「政治」等各式關係的不可或缺的價值與意義。尤其是在政治生活中，「第三方」與「絕對他者」的神聖性，更是我們具體實現正義、避免暴力的重要保障所在。第三，在這樣一種「宗教」關係之中，列維納斯以「無限的觀念」對於「我思故我在」的爆破為契機，試圖從根源處改變以現象學傳統為代表的哲學論述的言說方式，進而在一種對於「蹤跡」的追蹤中遭遇他者與無限。因此，我們可以說，雖然列維納斯所論述的這一「宗教」，具有非常鮮明的猶太教色彩；但是，這並不在邏輯上影響，這一寓「宗教」論述於其中的哲學思想，之於開啟一種新的多元論的意義，以及其所預示的人類進行徹底自我反思的價值。而這也就是列維納斯哲思中的「宗教」，其最終得以落腳的責任所在。

關鍵字

宗教；無限；他者；主體；面容；蹤跡；存在論；觀念論；反思；責任

並列摘要

Since the sixteenth century, in the inheritance and transmission of the ontology and idealism, what are expressed in the word “religion” have been placed in the context of underlining the subjectivity of in-itself and for-itself, thus continually losing its revelatory role for the finitude of human being, as well as for the infinity of the world of possibility. Although the academic research activities that appeal to “religion” continue to break through the constraint of the “Judeo-Christian tradition”, along with the birth and rapid development of the science of religion, the discursive modes bounded by the “humanity” and “socio-culture” still do not slip the leash of “thought and being are the same”. That “religion” opens infinity is in crisis. The philosophy of Levinas, aiming at reflecting the internal logic of modern western civilization and regarding the complicity of ontology and idealism as its object of rebellion, indicates that what it interprets as the “religion” oriented towards the alterity provides the important resources for getting out of the predicament of modernity. In a word, there are three main points of this philosophy. First, that this “religion” first appears in the form of “election” reveals the passivity and finitude of the subject, and relocates people in the world filled with strangeness; which thus powerfully resists the subjectivity theory highlighting in-itself and for-itself. Second, on the epiphany on the “face”, or the “face-to-face” relationship, Levinas uses the “religion” distinguished from theology to clarify that the “invocation” for infinity and the Other, and the “interpellation” and “education” for the “self” are of indispensable value and importance to numerous kinds of relations such as ethics, metaphysics, art, and even politics. Especially in politics, what ensure our realization of justice and avoidance of violence will be the sacredness of “le tiers” and “absolute Other”. Third, in such a kind of “religion”, Levinas taking the breakthrough of “the idea of infinity” in “cogito ergo sum” as an opportunity, attempts to radically alter the discursive modes of philosophical statements represented by the phenomenological tradition, and then encounters the other and infinity on the track of the “trace”. Therefore, we can say that Levinas’ “religion” is distinctly characterized by Judaism, which, however, does not logically affect the significance of this philosophical thinking embedded with the “religion” discourse, for opening a new pluralism, and the value of the thorough human self-reflexivity that it foreshadows. That is where the “religion” in Levinas' philosophy ultimately fulfills its responsibility.