賽局理論應用於台灣高鐵BOT案之策略研究

A Study on Game Theory Apply to THSR BOT Project Strategy

陳天健(Tien-chien Chen)

指導教授 ： 王隆昌 ； 林佑正

國立臺北科技大學/工程學院/工程科技研究所/博士(2012年)

https://doi.org/10.6841/NTUT.2012.00227

摘要

BOT專案常因契約的不確定性，機會主義(opportunism)開發商會利用資訊非對稱因素，以“投機行為”的行動和“有限理性” 的認知下出高價贏得標案，事後又藉著長期外部的變動，以代理困境(agency dilemma)優勢立場要求重新談判(renegotiation)變更契約條件，此舉讓政府陷入挾持問題(hold- up problem)，因而有參加投資、收購、貸款保證及利息補貼---等付出，這些引起人民對此結果巨大的不滿。本研究根據賽局理論(Game Theory)模型以台灣高速鐵路BOT專案為案例，分析該案在進行各階段，開發商如何在投標、變更契約條件時，運用不同策略創造持續競爭優勢；2007年該專案面臨嚴重的財務困境，本研究先以台灣高速鐵路開始營運後的財務資料，用現金流量折現(Discounted Cash Flow, DCF)法模擬計算出專案淨現值(Net Present Value, NPV)為-421,741,890 仟元，其專案價值已跌至「深度價外」(profound out-the-money)，經政府與開發商以「競合」(Co-opetition)關係重新談判，發現需採取「合作」(cooperation)策略且需在2011年前必須解決問題，雙方才能獲得最適當的報酬；繼以魯賓斯坦討價還價模型(Rubinstein bargaining model)為原則，實驗修正其壓力因子，建構出有限理性(bounded rationality)最佳討價還價區域(best bargaining area)為依據，評估後認為需在2009∼2010年二年內以(即27,203,236.∼10,881,294.仟元)之間談妥價格，由TH放棄專案由G保證收購HR資產，為解決財務困境的最佳方案。

關鍵字

BOT ； 重新談判 ； 挾持問題 ； 賽局理論

並列摘要

Uncertainty in a contract for some BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) projects may allow an opportunistic developer to take advantage of information asymmetrical factors, long-term external changes, and agency dilemma to request renegotiation and to alter the contract after it has been awarded. Such requests often entrap the government in hold-up problems and result in improper payments to the developers and may even create general public dissatisfaction with a project. In this paper, the Game Theory model is used to analyze the Taiwan High Speed Railroad project to examine how developers implement different strategies at the various stages of a project as well as alter the conditions of the contract in order to continually create competitive advantage after they have been awarded the contract. In 2007, this project developer was facing serious financial difficulties. In this study, the financial information on the Taiwan High Speed Railroad operations was used as the foundation for conducting a simulation to calculate the project’s value by means of Discounted Cash Flow(DCF) after this project began operation. It turned out to be －NT＄421,741,890 of Net Present Value (NPV). In a word, the value of this project fell in profound out-the-money. The government, thereby, could not but renegotiate with the developer through coopetition, finding that all the problems should be solved through cooperation by the end of 2011. The results will serve as reference to the best decision-making strategy for renegotiating costs in competition or cooperation. Also, this study will go on to alter the pressure factor in Rubinstein bargaining model to form the best bargaining area of bounded rationality. After this evaluation, the final price should be settled (NT＄27,203,236,000 ~ NT＄10,881,294,000)in two years (2009 ~ 2010). In the long run, TH is supposed to abandon this project and G has no choice but to purchase the estate of HR, which is the most appropriate solution of the finance dilemma.

並列關鍵字

BOT ； renegotiation ； hold-up problem ； Game Theory ； Rubinstein bargaining model.

參考文獻

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