在現今行銷通路管理中,通路成員間若能透過有效的通路管理機制,將能降低彼此間的投機行為,進而有效地建立通路關係,增進通路績效。因此本研究是要探討通路成員間之時間關係選擇、通路契約與影響策略對於通路績效之間的關係,並建構一研究行銷通路關係的理論架構,且以台灣地區台北市筆記型電腦經銷商為研究對象,採用問卷調查法進行資料收集,共取得有效回收問卷數248份,90.84%有效回收率,再利用結構方程式模式(SEM)進行資料分析,來驗證其關係。研究發現當供應商對經銷商使用強制影響策略頻率愈高,通路績效愈低;當供應商對經銷商使用非強制影響策略頻率愈高,通路績效愈高;當供應商對經銷商使用要求影響策略頻率愈高,通路績效愈高;當供應商與經銷商之間的通路契約程度愈高,非強制影響策略使用頻率愈高;當供應商與經銷商選擇愈為短期關係,非強制影響策略使用愈少;當供應商與經銷商選擇愈為長期關係,非強制影響策略使用愈頻繁;當供應商與經銷商選擇愈為長期關係,要求影響策略使用頻率愈高;當供應商與經銷商選擇愈為短期關係,通路契約程度愈低;當供應商與經銷商選擇愈為長期關係,通路契約程度愈高。
One of the major elements needed by the manufacturer to foster an outstanding performance of channel members at retail levels is an effective and efficient influence strategy. This paper conceptually creates a model to demonstrate the relationships among relational choice over time, channel contracting, influence strategy, and channel performance. The structural equation model (SEM) was employed using AMOS 7.0 as an anlysis tool to investigate the relationship among constructs. A model of the laptop industry is developed to illustrate these relationships. The questionnaire is primarily used in conducting this study. The results indicate that the more frequently that suppliers use corcive strategies, the lower is the retailers' channel performance;The more frequently that suppliers use non-corcive strategies, the greater is the retailers' channel performance;The more frequently that suppliers use request strategies, the greater is the retailers' channel performance;The greater is the supplier-retailer’s channel contract, the more frequently that suppliers use non-corcive strategies;The more is the supplier-retailer’s short-term relational choices,the less that suppliers use non-corcive strategies;The more is the supplier-retailer’s long-term relational choices,the more that suppliers use non-corcive strategies;The more is the supplier-retailer’s short-term relational choices,the less that suppliers use request strategies;The more is the supplier-retailer’s long-term relational choices,the more that suppliers use request strategies;The more is the supplier-retailer’s short-term relational choices,the less is retailers' channel contract。The more is the supplier-retailer’s long-term relational choices,the more is retailers' channel contract.