摘要 此篇論文的主要目的在於探討完成併購之公司內部人的交易行為與公司長期績效的關連性。結果顯示這兩者之間並沒有十分顯著的關係。其次,我們認為執行長(CEO)的交易行為對於公司長期報酬的影響會比其他內部人來的大,而我們的研究結果證明,當公司內的執行長(CEO)在公司完成併購之行為一年之內,只單純進行賣股權之行為,公司長期會明顯面臨不好的績效表現。此外,在我們的樣本中我們發現完成併購的公司其長期表現相對於配對公司來說都偏低。我們的結果亦與市場上認為內部人會較外部投資人握有較多資訊的想法一致,並且我們預期公司的內部重要人物會賣出價值被市場高估的股權。因此,當公司完成併購行為,並且投資人發現在併購完成之後一年內公司內部人(特別是執行長(CEO))單純賣出公司股權,則我們預期公司長期之下會有比較不好的績效。
Abstract This paper examines the relation between insiders’ trading and the long-run performance of acquiring firms. The article shows that there is no close relation between insiders’ trading and the long-run stock returns of acquiring firms. However, there is a close relation between the CEO’s transaction, only when CEO sells equity, and the long-run stock returns of acquiring firms. Acquiring firms significantly underperforms their benchmarks especially when top executives sell shares after completing mergers. This evidence is consistent with the notion that the insiders have more private information about firms which complete acquisitions and sell overvalued shares. In conclusion, the results suggest that it is not desirable to invest in acquiring firms when insiders sell shares after effective date.