安全電子投票系統之設計

The Design of Secure Electronic Voting System

黃昭龍(Jau-Lung Hwang)

指導教授 ： 黃士殷

元智大學/工程學院/電機與資訊工程研究所/碩士(1997年)

摘要

安全電子投票系統之設計

研究生：黃昭龍 指導教授：黃士殷

元智大學電機與資訊研究所

摘要

本論文提出一電子投票系統，希望藉由電腦與網路的結合，快速、安全且
正確的傳送與整合資料。傳統投票的重點，在於身份的確認與選票的安全
性正確性。但由於需耗費大量的物力人力，近年來雖透過電腦系統的協助
，已逐步簡化了以往繁瑣的投開票過程。但其中仍有許多方面，受限於環
境的因素，無法進一步得到改善，而因著這些因素，也使得投開票過程仍
陷於冗長。

電子投票系統最關鍵的問題在於如何設計其安全協定，這是一個隱含許多
設計困難的題目，它的安全考量不同於電子商務中SET(Secure
Electronic Transaction)所考量的方式。因此，本論文重點目的為結合
現行電腦安全的身份認證，保持傳輸資料安全與完整性的各種應用與標準
，定義出適用於複雜選舉下的電子選舉與投開票模式，並依此模型實作出
電子投票系統。

關鍵字

電子投票 ； 盲簽名 ； 匿名通道 ； 秘密分享 ； 隱私 ； 可驗證性

並列摘要

The Design of Secure Electronic Voting System

Student: Jau Lung Hwang Advisor: Dr. Shyh-In Hwang

Institute of the Electrical Engineering and Computer
Engineering & Science Yuan-Ze University

Abstract

As Internet has become more and more popular, electronic voting
based on Internet is also proving to be more practical to common
people. The key issue is how to reach the goal of both security
and privacy.

In this paper, we propose to design and implement a secure
voting protocol. In the protocol, the techniques of blind
signature and anonymous channel are used to protect the privacy
of the voter and to verify the validity of voting paper. Secure
sharing scheme is incorporated into the protocol to reduce the
trouble of two session voting. Also, the voting information is
published in the public bulletin board so that the voting result
can be verified. To sum up, the protocol proposed here can
satisfy a number of requirements of a practical secure
electronic voting system

Keywords：Electronic voting,Blind signature,Anonymous channel
,Secret sharing,Privacy,Verifiability

並列關鍵字

Electronic voting ； Blind Signature ； Anonymous Channel ； Secret Sharing ； Privacy ； Verifiability

參考文獻

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[2] D. L. Chaum. "Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses ,and digital pseudonyms". Communication of the ACM , Vol.24, No.2, pp.84-88(Feb.,1981).

[3] D. Chaum, "Elections with Unconditionally-secret Ballots and Disruption Equivalent to breaking RSA", in Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT '88, Leture Notes in Computer Science 330, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, pp.177-182(1988).

[4] Kenneth R. Iversen, "A Cryptographic Scheme for Computerized General Elections", in Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '91, Le0ture Notes in Computer Science 576, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, pp.405-419(1992)

[5] Josh D. Cohen and Michael J. Fischer. A robust and verifiable cryptographically secure election scheme (extended abstract). Technical Report YALEU/DCS/TR-454, Yale University, July 1985.