本研究主旨為探討公司管理當局之盈餘預測品質聲譽、盈餘預測修正與盈餘管理間之關係。動機為強制財務預測公開制度是否可能增加盈餘管理動機,其次為管理當局盈餘預測之品質聲譽對於其利用盈餘管理達成其盈餘預測目標之中介效果。以及探討本期盈餘管理決策對於未來盈餘預測誤差及盈餘預測修正決策之影響。最後則在探討財務預測修正決策之影響因素為何,及其與盈餘管理兩者間之關係。 本研究以Modified Jones Model估計裁決性應計項目金額,針對86年修正「公開發行公司財務預測資訊公開體系實施要點」後於86年至89年的樣本來探討其管理當局盈餘預測發佈與盈餘管理動機之關係。 實證結果如下: 1.在其他條件不變下,當操縱前盈餘為負以及當操縱前盈餘低於管理當局預測盈餘之20%以上時,經理人會利用裁決性應計項目之操縱以增加其列報盈餘。此外,當操縱前盈餘超過預測盈餘達20%以上時,經理人會利用裁決性應計項目以減少其列報盈餘。 2.各盈餘目標對盈餘管理影響之相對強度依次為操縱前盈餘為損失、操縱前盈餘高於管理當局預測盈餘達20%以上與操縱前盈餘低於預測盈餘達20%以上,後二者對於盈餘管理之影響強度則無顯著差異。 3.在其他條件不變下,當操縱前盈餘為負或操縱前盈餘低於預測盈餘20%時,若管理當局盈餘預測品質聲譽愈佳,則其利用裁決性應計項目以增加列報盈餘之幅度愈大。 4.在其他條件不變下,若本年度裁決性應計項目之金額愈高,則下一年度管理當局盈餘預測之不利誤差越大,顯示管理當局盈餘預測過度樂觀。若操縱前盈餘為損失或操縱前盈餘未達原始盈餘預測之20﹪時,經理人愈有可能修正其財務預測,且修正次數亦愈多。 5.當考量盈餘預測修正決策係盈餘管理決策之內生變數後,顯示此兩種工具存在替代關係。
There are four motivations of this thesis. First, to discuss whether forced financial information disclosure may give another motivation to manage earnings. Second, the intermediate effect between management earnings forecast reputation and the expect earnings. Third, the effectiveness of the earnings management decision this year to the forecast error and earnings forecast revision decision in the future. At last, the effect factors of financial forecast revision, and the relationship between it and earnings management. After the revision of “Guideline Governing the Disclosure of Financial Forecast Information by Public Companies” promulgated in 1997, public offering and season equity offering should seriatim disclosure the financial forecast to three and two years. Focused on the firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange and OTC over the period of 1997 to 2000, this thesis discusses the relationship between management earnings forecast and earnings management. The empirical results documents that when the pre-management earnings is loss and pre-management earnings below (over) the financial forecast 80﹪(120﹪), managers will manage the earnings upward (down) by discretionary accruals. The pre-management earnings is loss has stronger relative effectiveness of earnings management thresholds to pre-management earnings below (over) the financial forecast 80﹪(120﹪). When the pre-management earnings is loss and pre-management earnings below the financial forecast 80﹪and management earnings forecast reputation is better, managers will manage the earnings upward more by discretionary accruals. If the discretionary accruals this year is higher, the earnings forecast error next year is larger. It shows that managers forecast is too optimistic. If the pre-management earnings is loss and pre-management earnings below the financial forecast 80﹪, the more the loss are, the higher the probability and the frequency of earnings forecast revision. After controlling the autogenous variables, the earnings management decision and the earnings forecast revision decision have alternative relationship.