代理問題衝突：股權結構、決策選擇與公司績效交互效果之研究

Agency Conflict: The Mutual Influence among Strategic Choice, Equity Ownership and Firm Performance in Taiwan

王弈丞(Yi-Chen Wang)

指導教授 ： 周德瑋

元智大學/管理學院/財務金融學系/碩士(2007年)

摘要

Berle and Means（1932）及Jensen and Meckling（1976）指出所有者與管理者之間利益衝突所產生的代理問題，股權結構與公司績效間關係成為學者在理論及實務研究上的焦點；公司治理雖以監督公司管理階層，惟其最終目的仍在於增加公司價值亦即股東價值極大化；要透過什麼方法以降低管理者與所有權人間代理問題，截至今日亦無定論；為使公司價值極大化，必須選擇最適內部人士及機構法人持股比率、股利決策及負債融資比率以使公司總代理成本降為最低。故本研究期望藉由股權結構、財務決策與公司績效間關聯性探討，為後續研究提供最佳股權結構、財務決策的方向。
在內部人士持股比例實證結果方面，除了資本支出、股利支付率及公司風險外，其他皆為顯著。其中，內部人士持股比例與公司績效成顯著正向相關，並符合「利益收斂假說」。內部人士與風險呈負相關；與負債比率呈正相關，研判可能是董監事希望藉由負債治理機制的發揮，降低監督成本，使得公司代理成本降低所致。
實證結果顯示，在機構法人持股比例實證結果方面，機構法人持股比例與資本支出、負債比率和股利支付率比例均不顯著。其與公司績效為顯著正相關，機構法人持股比例與風險呈顯著負相關。

關鍵字

代理問題、股權結構、股利支付率、負債比率

並列摘要

Ever since Berle & Means (1932) and Jensen & Meckling (1976) suggested the correlation among enterprise performance, ownership structure and its agency problem from the conflict of interest between the business owner and the management, this topic has long been discussed and studied. Although a good corporate governance lies on the efficient and effective management and safeguarding of investors’ interest, the ultimate objective is to enhance the business value. Nevertheless, there is no exhaustive conclusion in resolving the agency problem and the enhancement of business value. Only a few studies discuss the right composition of shareholding by the internal investors as well as the institutional investors. Besides, dividend policy and capital structure also play na important role in decreasing the agency cost.
This study examines the relationship among the ownership structure, capital structure and enterprise performance and try to develop a framework model for future studies and research on this area to facilitate the decision making on the three elements. In the insider ownership, I find that the insider is positively related to firm performance and support convergence-of-interest hypothesis, but negatively related to risk of company. I also find there is a positive relation between debt ratio and insider holding. The result of institutional ownership shows that there is no significant stock holding ratio in capital expenditure, debt ratio and dividend payout ratio. There is a positive correlation between firm performance and institutional ownership, and a negative correlation between risk of company and institutional ownership.

並列關鍵字

agency problem, ownership, dividend payout ratio, debt ratio

參考文獻

Chen, Shu Ping. “A review on the relationship between ownership structure and capital

University, 1998.

Ye, Yin-Hua. and Shean-Bii. Chiu. “The Relationship Between The Capital Structure、

Ownership Structure and company’s value.” NTU Management Reivew 7, no.2 Journal of Finance 43, 1996 : 57-90.

Part of English