摘要
本篇論文主要探討股權結構與會計保守原則的關係，並採用 Givoly and Hayn (2000)的應計基礎和 Basu (1997)的盈餘對資訊反應迴歸模式來衡量保守性。公司的股權結構大致分為主要經理人、董監事團隊、大股東與機構投資人，假設會計保守原則可以降低代理人與委託人的代理問題，則隨著代理問題增加，則對會計保守原則的需求程度可能越高。最後，實證結果顯示: (1)主要經理人持股比率對會計保守原則需求程度呈負向關係。(2)董監事團隊持股比率對會計保守原則需求程度呈負向關係。(3)大股東持股比率對會計保守原則需求程度呈負向關係。(4)機構投資人持股比率對會計保守原則需求程度呈負向關係。此實證結果亦隱含著利益一致假說，並支持本文假說，會計保守原則確實可以降低代理人與委託人之間的代理問題。
並列摘要
This paper exploits the relationship between ownership structure and the demand for accounting conservatism. Ownership structure includes the shares owned by CEO, directors and executive as a group, block holders, and institutional investors. Using the firm specific proposed by Givoly and Hayn (2000) and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings addressed by Basu (1997) as a proxy for accounting conservatism, to examine the effect of the fraction of shares owned by CEO, directors and executive as a group, block holders, and institutional investors. Since accounting conservatism is anticipated to mitigate agency problems between agents and principles, we predict that these agency problems increase the demand for accounting conservatism. The findings indicate that (i) a negative relationship between the percentage of a firm’s shares owned by CEO and conservatism, (ii) a negative relationship between the percentage of a firm’s shares owned by directors and executive as a group and conservatism, (iii) a negative relationship between the percentage of a firm’s shares owned by block holders and conservatism, and (iv) a negative relationship between the percentage of a firm’s shares owned by institutional investors and conservatism. It is consistent with the implication of the convergence of interest hypothesis. The empirical results are robust to various control variables, the market-to-book ratio, leverage, firm size, and litigation risk. These evidences support our prediction and propose the possibility that accounting conservatism contributes to addressing the agency problem between agents and principles.
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