併購動機:台灣實證研究分析

Motives for Takeovers：An Empirical Investigation in Taiwan

魏郁華(Yu-Hua Wei)

指導教授 ： 周德瑋

元智大學/管理學院/財務金融學系/碩士(2006年)

摘要

本篇論文研究併購動機有綜效、代理及傲慢理論。我們觀察目標、主併與總報酬之間的相關性來區分此三種假說。綜效假說預期目標報酬與總報酬相關為正，而代理及傲慢假說分別預期為負相關及零相關。目標報酬與主併報酬相關性方面，綜效預期為正相關，而代理及傲慢假說皆預期為負相關。實證結果顯示，無論在正面總報酬或負面總報酬中，目標報酬與總報酬以及目標報酬與主併報酬之間的相關性皆為負相關。此結果顯示台灣的併購動機主要是以代理與傲慢理論為主。

關鍵字

合併與收購 ； 綜效 ； 代理 ； 傲慢 ； 目標報酬 ； 主併報酬

並列摘要

According to previous literature, the motives for merger and acquisition consist of synergy, agency, and hubris. We distinguish three hypotheses by looking at the correlation between target, acquirer and total gains. It is argued that synergy hypothesis predicts positive correlation between target and total gains while the agency and hubris hypothesis predict negative and zero correlation between the two, respectively. Moreover, synergy hypothesis also predicts positive correlation between target and acquirer gains while both agency and hubris hypotheses predict negative correlation between target gains and acquirer gains. The empirical results show that agency and hubris are the driven motives among those three hypotheses for merger and acquisition in Taiwan.

並列關鍵字

merger and acquisition ； synergy ； agency ； hubris ； target gains ； acquirer gains

參考文獻

C. Edward Wang, De-Wai Chou, and Hung-Rong Chen, 2006, Determinant Factors of Payment Method of Mergers and Market Reaction, Review of Securities and Futures Markets (TSSCI).

Berkovitch, E. and M. P. Narayanan, 1993, Motives for Takeovers: An Empirical Investigation, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 28(3), 347-362.

Fama, E. F., 1980, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, Journal of Political Economy 88, 288-307.

Fama, E. F., and M. C. Jensen, 1983, Separation of Ownership and Control, Journal of Law and Economics 26, 301-325.

Firth, M., 1980, Takeovers, Shareholder Returns and the Theory of the Firms, Quarterly Journal of Economics 94, 235-260.