四大會計師事務所能否提升東亞國家之公司價值?

Do Big-4 auditors enhance firm’s value in Eastern Asia?

王資萱(Tzu-Hsuan Wang)

指導教授 ： 吳菊華

元智大學/管理學院/商學碩士班(財務金融學程)/碩士(2011年)

摘要

本論文研究僱用四大會計師是否可以減輕代理問題，藉此緩和經理人與股東或是經理人與債權人之間的代理問題，而不僅只是一個公司治理的機制。我們蒐集了從2002到2008年間，代理問題比較嚴重的東亞新興國家的資料。目的是測試公司聘用四大會計師是否能降低代理成本，抑或只是法律上必須遵守的管理機制。本文更進一步證明，在公司僱用四大會計師後，能有效的降低代理問題，同時也能夠使公司價值有所提升。

關鍵字

四大會計師事務所 ； 代理成本 ； 公司價值

並列摘要

This paper investigates whether hiring Big-4 auditor could mitigate the agency problem and alleviate the conflicts between manager and share/debt holders, not just serves as a bonding mechanism of corporate governance. The data will be collected from 6 emerging markets during 2002 to 2008 in Eastern Asia where the agency problem is more severe than other developed countries. We want to test whether Big-4 auditors can mitigate agency cost or it is just a governance bonding mechanism in law. This paper further proves that after employing Big-4 auditors, the firm value measured by ROA, TOBINS’Q and SALES will be improved.

並列關鍵字

Big-4 auditor ； agency cost ； firm value

參考文獻

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