鑒於稽徵機關於初步調查虛設行號及取得虛設行號發票扣抵稅額營業人之不法行為時,常因未取得直接證據,致尚需耗費龐大稽徵人力進行調查及蒐集證據。據此,本研究應用囚犯困境賽局理論,以建構虛設行號及取得虛設行號發票扣抵稅額營業人間之賽局,進行查核策略分析,期應用囚犯困境之不合作策略增加營業人之犯罪成本及風險,突破兩造之心防,進而取得認諾之直接證據,以提昇稽徵績效及遏止不法。研究結果發現,若能將囚犯困境賽局應用於虛設行號及取得虛設行號發票扣抵稅額營業人之稅務調查中,則可藉由誘因及威脅之設計,建立營業人面臨囚犯困境之賽局。而依模型分析可預測出,一個建置完善的囚犯困境模型將能誘使不實交易買賣雙方之營業人,傾向選擇「承認」為其優勢策略。
Where Tax Collection Authorities preliminarily investigate an illegality of bogus business entity to secure fraudulent invoices and offset an amount of tax, they have to consume massive collecting manpower, conduct investigations, and collect evidences , for lack of the direct evidence. This study, on these grounds, applies the game theory of prisoner’s dilemma to conduct audits and analyze strategy; the aforesaid game theory indicates that businessmen establish bogus business entity to obtain statutory invoices, then, further to counterbalance the payable tax. We expect to apply the uncooperative strategy of prisoner’s dilemma to increase the cost and risk of businessmen’s crime, overcome both parties’ psychological barrier, and further to obtain direct evidence, so as to enhance the collecting performance and deter the illegality. Our research findings discover, should we apply game theory of prisoner’s dilemma to tax-affair investigations on bogus business entity to acquire invoice for offset of the tax amount, we could thereby design a decoy (or an incentive) and threaten to have businessmen face the game of prisoner’s dilemma. In accordance with the model analysis, we may forecast that a perfect model of prisoner’s dilemma could lead businessmen who engage in fraudulent transaction to select “Confession” as their advantageous strategy.