董事會獨立性、家族控制與績效：台灣上市半導體公司的實證分析

Board Independence, Family Control, and Performance in Taiwanese Listed Semiconductor Companies

郭乾隆(QianLong Kweh)

指導教授 ： 王維康

元智大學/管理學院/商學碩士班(會計學程)/碩士(2012年)

https://doi.org/10.6838/YZU.2012.00067

摘要

本研究探討董事會獨立性、家族控制與公司績效之間的關係，並使用家族控制為干擾變數以探討其在董事會獨立性與公司績效之關係的調節影響。本研究首先採用以動態差額變數為基礎測度(dynamic slack-based measure)的資料包絡分析法模式，以估算出公司的經營效率值。本研究亦採用拔靴截斷式回歸進行多元分析以探討董事會獨立性、家族控制與公司績效之關聯性，和以家族控制為干擾變數下董事會獨立性與公司績效之關聯性。研究樣本為2005-2010年的44家台灣上市半導體公司。實證結果發現，獨立董事及董事長兼總經理職務分離的存在與公司經營效率呈現顯著的正相關，而家族控制對公司經營效率則呈現顯著的負相關。研究結果也顯示獨立董事會對公司經營效率的正向效果在家族企業是較弱的。本研究針對加強董事會獨立性提出觀點,作為台灣金融監督管理委員修訂公司治理實務守則之參考。

關鍵字

董事會獨立性 ； 家族企業 ； 動態資料包絡分析法 ； 截斷式回歸 ； 台灣半導體產業

並列摘要

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between board independence, family control and management, and corporate performance in Taiwanese listed semiconductor companies. This study also aims to examine the moderating effect of family control and management on the relationship between board independence and corporate performance. This study applies dynamic slacks-based measure (DSBM) model to estimate firm operating efficiency scores. Truncated regression with a bootstrapping procedure is employed for multivariate analysis using a sample of 44 Taiwanese listed semiconductor companies for the period of 2005-2010.
Our findings illustrate that the presence of independent directors and the separation of Chairman and CEO positions are significantly positively related to firm operating efficiency. Family ownership has a negative impact on firm operating efficiency. The results also show that the positive effect of proportion of independent directors on firm operating efficiency is significantly weakened in family companies. This study provides Taiwan’s Financial Supervisory Commission with a practical insight for enhancing corporate governance best-practice principles regarding the true independence of the independent directors, especially for family companies.

並列關鍵字

Taiwanese semiconductor industry ； Board independence ； Family companies ； Dynamic data envelopment analysis ； Truncated regression

參考文獻

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