股權結構與董事會組成對董事酬金契約誘因有效性之影響

The Effects of Ownership Structure and Board Composition on the Incentive Effectiveness of Director Compensation

胡映伶(Ying-Ling Hu)

指導教授 ： 丁碧慧

共同指導教授 ： 譚醒朝

長榮大學/管理學院/經營管理研究所(博)/碩士(2009年)

摘要

本研究以2002年至2007年之台灣上市公司為研究對象，探討董事酬金對經營績效是否具有激勵效果，並進而探究股權結構與董事會組成對董事酬金契約誘因有效性之影響。
董事酬金一般包含董事固定報酬與董事酬勞兩個主要部分，由於董事酬勞係公司每年稅後盈餘所提撥的一部分金額，以酬謝董事過去一年辛勞並激勵董事於未來年度繼續為公司奉獻心力，故本研究採平均董事酬勞、董事酬勞占稅後盈餘分配比率以及董事酬勞占董事酬金總額之比率為董事酬金之代理變數。
實證結果發現，會計績效方面，平均董事酬勞與董事酬勞占董事酬金總額之比率皆對其產生正向顯著影響，至於其餘酬金變數則對市場與會計績效均無影響。若進一步將股權結構與董事會組成等相關變數列入討論後，則可發現在會計績效方面，股權結構與董事會組成確實會影響董事酬金契約誘因有效性。會計績效方面，當控制股東之所有權愈高時，對董事酬金契約誘因有效性有負向顯著影響。其次，外部董事比例愈高，愈能發揮董事酬金契約誘因有效性。至於市場績效方面，則僅有機構投資人持股比率愈高時，方能發揮董事酬金契約誘因之有效性。

關鍵字

董事酬金、公司經營績效

並列摘要

In this research, listed companies of Taiwan between 2002 and 2007 are targeted to study if compensation for directors are having incentive effect on firm performance, and extend to the study of the influence of ownership structure and composition of board of directors on the incentive effectiveness of director compensation contract.
The compensation for directors is generally consisted of fixed compensation for directors and variable compensation for directors and it was paid out from the after-tax earning of the company each year to show gratitude to directors for their hardworking and endeavor of the past year and prompt their contribution for the future years. In this research, we took average variable compensation for directors, the ratio of compensation for directors to the distributed after tax earning and the ratio of variable compensation for directors to gross compensation as the proxy variables of compensation for directors.
The empirical study gave the following findings:
1. In accounting performance: All variable, average variable compensation for director and the ratio of variable compensation for directors to gross compensation are having significant positive effect.
2. All other compensation variables do not have effect in both market and accounting performances.
When the ownership structure and composition of board of directors are included in the variables for discussion, it is found that ownership structure and composition of board of directors are indeed affecting the incentive effectiveness of compensation for directors. In accounting performance, when the ratio of ownership of controlling stockholders is higher, the incentive effectiveness of compensation for directors is with significant negative effect. However, in accounting performance, with internal and external supervision mechanism, the higher the ratio of outside directors, the incentive effectiveness of compensation for directors is higher. As to the market performance, only the higher ratio of the institutional investor holding has shown the incentive effectiveness of contract of compensation for directors.

並列關鍵字

Director Compensation、Firm Performance

參考文獻

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