盈餘品質管理在國內外文獻上相當多元,有別過去多以盈餘品質應計項目盈餘管理作為研究的方向,本文採以實質盈餘管理來做董事及監察人(董監事)持股與酬勞探討其與公司治理績效之相關聯,本研究以2005-2012上市上櫃公司為研究樣本,並參照Dechow et al. (1998) 及Roychowdhury (2006)衡量實質盈餘管理之模式。 研究結果顯示,當董監事具有高持股時,較一般低持股之董監事更具有經營策略的選擇,將與公司利益會更趨一致,使公司呈現健全的方向發展,降低與股東之間的資訊不對稱的情形,操弄盈餘之動機較為薄弱,公司盈餘品質較佳。另在具有高報酬之董監事情況下,因要持續擁有高報酬的薪資,而較不會去做對公司有損傷之情況,會減少操弄盈餘,維持其盈餘品質,使公司盈餘品質較佳。然而在董監事持股與其報酬之交叉項卻顯示出具有高持股及高報酬之董監事,若公司盈餘表現良好,可能在股票上及薪資報酬領取較多之報酬誘因下,操弄盈餘之動機較強,因此盈餘品質較差。
Earnings quality management in the literature very diverse, differ from much past with the abnormal accruals as a direction of research by surplus quality, this study collected in real earnings management to do the directors and supervisors to explore associated with the governance performance of the company, the study was to 2005-2012 publicly traded companies in the study sample and reference Dechow et al. (1998) and Roychowdhury (2006) to measure the substance of earnings management mode. The empirical result show that when ownership by board members have high holdings will be more in line with the interests of the company, reduce and shareholders the case of information asymmetry, earnings quality is better. And when the board members remuneration are high, they have to continue to have high salaries, and less to do damage to the company's situation, will reduce earnings manipulation, the company's earnings quality is better. However, in the cross-term of ownership by board members and board members remuneration demonstrate the earnings quality is worse, Guess they want to obtain more remunerations, so hold the motive of making the surplus also higher.