人文科學的客觀性：從作者意圖論之爭談起

為解決人文科學於19世紀期間深陷的科學主義泥淖，高達美放棄追求科學方法，改以其哲學詮釋學重新闡述人文科學的真理及其存有方式。自此，「真理」與「方法」決裂，象徵著人文科學與自然科學的根本分歧。但在前海德格詮釋學與哲學詮釋學間有一值得注意的顯著差異：前者仍相信作者意圖的重要性，詮釋的任務在於客觀理解之；而後者則認為詮釋是種由讀者與文本所敞開的辯證遊戲，作者已無關緊要，亦無客觀可言。正是在這一差異上，赫施以保衛作者為由，批判哲學詮釋學的相對主義傾向，並強調唯有回到以作者為目的自身的理解，才能開啟詮釋學理想中的對話。一般而言，赫施的批評並未受到重視。時人大多視之為向方法論詮釋學的倒行逆施。正是在此背景下，本論文試圖重新爬梳這兩相扞格之詮釋理論的內容與脈絡，並以舒爾茨與波普的立場為切入點，指出潛藏在該爭論底下的歷史主義與科學態度之爭。而貫穿這三重爭論的，事實上是一個關於科學實作之規範原則的抉擇。由此我將嘗試性地主張，透過波普之猜想-反駁邏輯修正後的赫施詮釋學，更有被我們採納的理由。因為該詮釋學或許才能真正保全人文科學知識的多元、尊重與客觀有效性，並避免任何只為鞏固自身傳統或權威的風險發生。

關鍵字

詮釋學；人文科學；作者意圖；科學哲學；高達美；赫施；波普；舒爾茨

並列摘要

To tackle the problem of the decline of human sciences against the rise of scientism in the 19th century, Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics proposed to forsake scientific methods in order to reclaim the truth and existing form of human sciences. Since then, truth and method have been considered to be in opposition to each other, which hints at a fundamental distinction between human and natural sciences. Yet, there is a substantial difference exists between pre-Heidegger hermeneutics and philosophical hermeneutics. For pre-Heidegger hermeneutics, author’s intention still plays an important role and requires thus an objective textual interpretation. In contrast, philosophical hermeneutics considers interpretation merely as a dialectic game between readers and texts, and downplays thereby the significance of both the author and objective interpretation process. To defense the author’s status, E. D. Hirsch addressed this difference by criticizing the relativistic tendency of the philosophical hermeneutics and he argued that only an interpretation that was oriented toward authors could initiate a real hermeneutic dialogue. The critique of Hirsch was frequently disregarded as reactive and as an untimely restoration of the methodological hermeneutics. In view of this methodic controversy, this paper reexamines the content and logic of the two opposing hermeneutic theories. Our reexamination would make reference to Gunter Scholtz and Karl Popper and it attempt to explore the problems of historicism and scientific attitudes hidden behind the debate. We would show that the debate is essentially related to a choice between the normative principles of scientific practices. And I would try to modify Hirsch’s hermeneutics through the logic of conjecture and refutation outlined by Popper. This modified hermeneutics could effectively sustain the pursuit of diversity, respect, and objective validity in the practice of human sciences and guard us against the danger of idiosyncratic, self-interested, or ideologically biased interpretation.