論賽勒斯《經驗主義與心靈哲學》中的既與之迷思

許多學者認為，知識論上的證成是依賴於既與的，而什麼是我們證成的最終依據，就取決於我們把什麼東西當成既與而定。舉例來說，有些學者主張，我們對外在世界的信念之證成是透過我們對外在世界的經驗既與而來。然而，賽勒斯（Wilfrid Sellars）在《經驗主義與心靈哲學》中對既與在知態證成的角色施加嚴厲的批評。他反對這種訴諸既與的證成觀點，並且堅持「通過既與並無法使我們得到知識論上的證成」。本論文的主要工作即是要檢視賽勒斯對既與之迷思的批評，並進一步考察在反對既與之迷思的情況下，賽勒斯如何去說明「證成」這個概念。此外，本論文也將討論一些哲學家，包括：史諾登（Paul Snowdon）、奧斯頓（William Alston）、布蘭登（Robert Brandom）等人對於賽勒斯說法的批評，我將說明這些批評皆不成立，並試著以賽勒斯式的方式逐個辯護。

關鍵字

賽勒斯；既與之迷思；經驗主義；理由之邏輯空間

並列摘要

Many philosophers think that the chain of justification of belief ultimately terminates on what is called “the Given”. Nevertheless, Sellars strongly criticizes the alleged epistemic role played by this notion, which he regards as being mysterious in nature. Although there are different ways of appealing to the Given, according to Sellars, none of them succeeds. In this thesis, my main tasks are: (1) to examine Sellars’ notion of the myth of the Given and expose how he rejects it with different arguments; (2) to elucidate Sellars’ view of justification and how he tackles with the problem of infinite regress of justification; (3) to argue against the criticisms of Sellars from Snowdon, Alston and Brandom respectively.

並列關鍵字

Sellars ； the myth of the Given ； empiricism ； the space of the reason

參考文獻

-Ayer, A. J. (1945). The Terminology of Sense Data. Mind, 54, pp.289-312.

-Alston, W. P. (2002). Sellars and the "Myth of the Given". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65, 1, pp.69-86.

-Brandom, R. (2015). The Centrality of Sellars’ Two-Ply Account of Observation to Arguments of “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”. In Brandom, R. (Ed.), From Empiricism to Expressivism: Brandom reads Sellars. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

-DeVries, W. A. & Paul, C. (2009). Brandom's Two‐Ply Error. In DeVries, W. A.(Ed.), Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity, and Realism: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, pp.131-146.

-Liang, C. (2006). Phenomenal Character and the Myth of the Given.

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論賽勒斯《經驗主義與心靈哲學》中的既與之迷思

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